Pakistan and Libya Sign $4B Defense Deal Including JF-17 Fighter Jets and Pilot Training..

Pakistan has finalized a weapons export package worth more than $4 billion to Libya’s eastern-based Libyan National Army, led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, according to officials cited by Reuters. The deal, which reportedly includes JF-17 fighter jets and training aircraft, highlights Pakistan’s push into high-end arms exports and raises new questions about the enforcement of the UN arms embargo on Libya.

Pakistan has concluded one of the largest weapons export agreements in its history, signing a multibillion-dollar deal to supply combat aircraft and military equipment to Libya’s eastern-based Libyan National Army, according to information published by Reuters on December 22, 2025. Pakistani officials said the agreement was finalized following a meeting in Benghazi between Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Saddam Khalifa Haftar, deputy commander in chief of the LNA, with deliveries expected to unfold over roughly two and a half years.
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Pakistan's JF-17 multirole fighter stands at the center of a more than $4 billion arms deal with Libya's eastern-based Libyan National Army, marking a rare South to South defense agreement aimed at rebuilding combat airpower, securing oil infrastructure, and strengthening Khalifa Haftar's military leverage despite the UN arms embargo (Picture source: Shimin Gu - JetPhotos).  

A copy of the draft agreement lists 16 JF-17 fighter jets and 12 Super Mushak trainer aircraft, and one Pakistani official confirmed that the list was accurate, while acknowledging that final quantities for some items could still shift inside the broader package. Two officials put the total above 4 billion dollars, and two said it reached 4.6 billion dollars, a spread that suggests the price tag likely includes not only aircraft but also training, sustainment, and additional equipment for land, sea, and air domains that were part of the wider arrangement. The LNA’s own media channel said it had entered a defence cooperation pact with Pakistan, including weapons sales, joint training, and military manufacturing, and Haftar himself framed it as a strategic shift, saying on Al Hadath television that a new phase of strategic military cooperation with Pakistan had begun.

The technical center of gravity is the JF-17. Pakistan Aeronautical Complex lists the fighter’s maximum take-off weight at 13,500 kilograms, maximum speed at Mach 1.6, and service ceiling at 55,500 feet, positioning it as a lightweight multirole platform designed to deliver credible combat performance without the cost burden and political constraints often associated with Western fighters. The aircraft is commonly described as carrying weapons and pods on seven external hardpoints, with a payload in the 3,700-kilogram class and integration options for medium-range air-to-air missiles alongside guided and unguided air-to-ground munitions. Pakistan is marketing the JF-17 abroad as a lower-cost multirole fighter offered with training and maintenance outside Western supply chains, a critical factor for Libya, where access to spare parts and diplomatic recognition are strategic variables rather than administrative details.

The 12 Super Mushak trainers are not an accessory but an enabler for an air arm that can actually regenerate. The aircraft is powered by a Textron Lycoming IO-540 engine producing 260 horsepower and is designed for basic flight training. In a Libyan context, basic trainers are operationally consequential because the country’s airpower has fractured since 2011, with sortie generation relying on a mix of ageing jets, improvised maintenance practices, and, more recently, armed drones. Pairing a modern fighter fleet with a trainer aircraft creates a pipeline for screening, primary flight training, and conversion to jets, allowing the force to sustain losses and attrition over time. It also enables the development of domestic instructors and technicians, reducing reliance on foreign contractors whose presence can become politically sensitive or vulnerable to sanctions pressure.

The timing of the acquisition reflects Libya’s geography and the economics of coercion. Haftar controls much of eastern and southern Libya, including key oilfields, while the UN-recognised Government of National Unity holds much of the west, and neither side has achieved a durable monopoly of force. In this environment, a 16-aircraft fighter wing is less about classic air superiority and more about operational tempo. It enables rapid strike missions, armed overwatch of ground columns, deterrent patrols over oil infrastructure, and the ability to threaten time-sensitive targets across long desert lines of communication. It also provides a counterweight to drone-centric warfare, which has become a defining feature of Libya’s post 2019 battlespace. The strategic logic is to build a controllable, state-like air instrument for the LNA that can signal strength to internal rivals and external sponsors alike.

The deal’s legality and implementation will be closely scrutinized because Libya remains under a UN arms embargo imposed in February 2011, requiring Security Council approval for transfers of weapons and related material. It was not immediately clear whether Pakistan or Libya applied for exemptions, even as Pakistani officials insisted the arrangement did not violate UN restrictions and pointed to broader international engagement with Libyan actors. This position contrasts with repeated UN assessments that embargo enforcement has been weak and inconsistent, allowing significant volumes of military equipment to enter Libya despite formal prohibitions. European enforcement efforts add another layer, as the European Union established Operation IRINI to help implement the embargo through aerial, satellite, and maritime monitoring, including inspections of suspect vessels.

What makes the package politically striking is not only its size but its direction. In a global arms market still dominated by the United States and a small group of European exporters, a multibillion-dollar transfer from a Global South producer to a Global South buyer remains unusual, particularly when combat aircraft are involved. Pakistan is explicitly seeking to expand its defence export footprint by promoting a domestic industry that spans aircraft, armoured vehicles, munitions, and naval construction, and by leveraging the operational reputation of its air force as part of its export narrative.

The Libya-Pakistan link is also notable because there is little public record of sustained, large-scale Pakistani arms exports to Libya in recent decades. Instead, the agreement is being framed as a broader cooperation framework that includes joint training and potential military manufacturing, echoing Pakistan’s approach in other markets where aircraft sales are packaged as long-term industrial and institutional partnerships rather than single deliveries. Reports from Benghazi indicate that senior officers from both sides’ general staffs participated in the signing, reinforcing the idea that this is intended as a durable strategic relationship.

Financial details of the transaction have not been disclosed, but Libya’s oil-dependent economy provides important context. Hydrocarbons dominate exports and government revenue, and oil income remains the primary source of hard currency for Libyan actors controlling production and export terminals. This revenue base explains how the LNA can credibly negotiate a multiyear acquisition plan despite Libya’s fractured state institutions.

If the aircraft are delivered with robust spares, integrated munitions, and a sustainable training pipeline, the LNA could field the most coherent fast jet capability seen from any Libyan faction in years, shifting the internal balance away from ad hoc drone strikes and sporadic legacy jet operations toward a more structured air posture. If sustainment falters or political pressure tightens enforcement, the deal could instead remain symbolic. Either way, the scale and South to South character of the agreement mark it as a watershed moment, both for Haftar’s strategy and for Pakistan’s ambition to compete as a full-spectrum defence exporter on the global stage.