France Develops Fury 120 Interceptor to Counter Shahed-Type Drones Used by Russia.

On 27 January 2026, Challenges reported that a French SME has developed a new interceptor called Fury 120 to defeat one-way attack drones like Iran’s Shahed and Russia’s Geran. The project highlights how the spread of low-cost drones in Ukraine is pushing air defense innovation beyond traditional state-led programs.

According to reporting by Challenges on 27 January 2026, the Fury 120 interceptor was designed to shoot down one-way attack drones such as Iran’s Shahed series and their Russian Geran derivatives, which have been used extensively in Ukraine. Unlike most French military systems, Fury 120 was not developed under a Direction générale de l’armement framework or backed by a major prime contractor, but was instead funded and built independently by ALM Meca, an Alsace-based SME specializing in precision machining.
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The Fury 120 interceptor is reported to reach a maximum speed of 700 km/h, roughly three times faster than many potential targets (Picture source: ALM MECA via Challenges)

Since 2022, low-cost attack drones have become tools of attrition, able to saturate defences, deplete surface-to-air missile stocks, and force militaries into unfavourable trade-offs. The Iranian Shahed drone, also produced and employed in Russia, is not a highly sophisticated system, but it combines a useful range, a signature that can be difficult to handle at low altitude, and a swarm-style employment concept that multiplies approach routes and entry points. In this context, the question is no longer only whether an armed force can intercept a drone, but whether it can neutralise enough of them quickly and at a sustainable cost.

Fury 120 is positioned within this equation. According to Challenges, the interceptor is about 1.1 metres long with a wingspan of a little over one metre. With the appearance of a small fighter-like aircraft, it is designed around speed, and this characteristic is presented as an operational advantage. The platform uses a kerosene-fuelled microjet engine, a propulsion choice that sets it apart from many current counter-drone systems still largely based on propellers and endurance-focused designs. This enables Fury 120 to reach a stated maximum speed of 700 km/h, roughly three times that of many potential targets. In practical terms, this speed margin reduces pursuit time, increases the likelihood of catching the target, and widens engagement opportunities when detection occurs late.

Fury 120 is also described as being capable of sustaining manoeuvres of up to 20G, a level rarely associated with light interceptor drones. Against relatively non-manoeuvring targets such as Shahed-type drones, this is less about air-to-air manoeuvre combat than about retaining correction capacity. In real conditions, interception often takes place at low altitude in constrained airspace, with possible sensor disruptions and delays in the decision chain. A high manoeuvre margin allows the interceptor to recover its trajectory, compensate for imperfect guidance, and maintain a favourable intercept geometry despite a degraded tactical situation.

The project’s interest also lies in its industrial pathway. ALM Meca is not part of the usual circle of French defence prime contractors, and its profile as a precision-mechanics specialist contrasts with that of a systems integrator. However, the war in Ukraine shows that innovation does not come only from large-scale programmes; it can also result from constraints, urgency, and the ability to assemble existing building blocks quickly to produce a concrete military effect. Developing an interceptor drone in under a year, using private funding, fits into an accelerated experimentation approach that is spreading across Europe, driven by Ukraine’s experience and by pressure on inventories and budgets.

Thierry Berthier, a research associate at the Research Centre of the Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan Military Academy (CReC) and adviser to ALM Meca, argues that Fury 120 occupies a niche that remains limited in Europe and that, at this stage, there is no direct equivalent on the continent. He cites Anduril’s US-developed Roadrunner as a reference point; while no European country has officially announced the acquisition of Roadrunner as an in-service capability, European interest in Anduril’s solutions appears to be growing, as illustrated by the industrial rapprochement with Rheinmetall aimed at offering counter-drone options adapted to the European market. This indicates that the requirement is increasingly recognised and that competition will depend as much on integration into existing air-defence architectures as on interceptor performance alone.

A microjet-powered interceptor is intended to restore a favourable cost-effectiveness balance in close-range air defence. In saturation attacks, high-end ground-based air-defence systems can be tasked beyond their optimal role, and expensive guided missiles may be expended against targets of low unit value. A fast interceptor drone could, in theory, take on part of this mission set, particularly against slow and predictable attack drones. It could be launched from dispersed sites, cued by surveillance radars, or directed via electro-optical sensors, then committed to a rapid intercept. Constraints remain substantial: endurance limits linked to propulsion, kerosene logistics, microjet maintenance requirements, and reliance on robust data links for guidance. The intended effect is to relieve pressure on defences, preserve missiles for more complex threats, and expand engagement options.

The emergence of such a capability comes as the threat is no longer confined to the Ukrainian theatre. NATO’s eastern flank countries face recurring incidents linked to Russian attacks, sometimes involving airspace violations caused by drones crossing borders or drifting off route. In a statement dated 23 September 2025, NATO’s North Atlantic Council said several Allies, including Poland and Romania, had experienced violations and noted consultations under Article 4 following what it described as a large-scale violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones. In this environment, a European interceptor dedicated to attacking drones becomes a resilience tool as well as a weapon system: it strengthens the protection of critical infrastructure, limits the depletion of missile stocks, and reduces the risk of inadvertent escalation linked to repeated incursions. If Fury 120 moves from prototype to deployable capability, it could illustrate a broader shift in European doctrine, increasingly forced to treat mass, attrition, and cost as central variables of modern air defence.