Iran’s Ballistic Missiles Threatening US Bases Across Middle East Explained.

Iran’s missile force has become the defining operational factor in Operation Epic Fury, placing U.S. bases, allied infrastructure, shipping lanes, and regional capitals within overlapping strike ranges. The outcome will hinge less on missile stockpiles alone and more on Tehran’s ability to protect launchers, sustain reload cycles, and coordinate large-scale saturation attacks against defended targets.

Iran’s missile arsenal now stands at the center of the confrontation unfolding under Operation Epic Fury, with U.S. bases, allied facilities, maritime chokepoints, and regional capitals falling within layered strike envelopes. Tehran fields one of the region’s most diversified inventories, including short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, anti-ship systems, heavy artillery rockets, and space launch vehicles with dual-use technological implications. Military analysts note that under sustained combat conditions, the decisive variables extend beyond raw missile counts to include the survivability of mobile launchers, hardened storage sites, reload capacity, command-and-control resilience, and the ability to orchestrate coordinated salvos capable of stressing or saturating regional air and missile defense networks.
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Graphic showing layered Iranian missile threat rings from 150 km to 2,000 km, demonstrating how Tehran’s SRBM, MRBM, and cruise missile inventory places regional military installations within overlapping strike ranges. (Picture source: CSIS)

At the short-range level, Iran fields a dense inventory of SRBMs (Short-Range Ballistic Missiles) with ranges of 150–800 km, optimized for rapid launch and mobility. The Fateh-110 family, operational at 200–300 km, remains a core tactical strike system, employing solid-fuel missiles and road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers that reduce preparation time and increase survivability. The improved Fateh-313 extends that reach to approximately 500 km while retaining solid-fuel readiness and improved guidance. Legacy platforms such as the Shahab-1, with a 285–330 km range, and the Shahab-2, with a 500 km range, remain operational and may have benefited from incremental modernization programs that include guidance refinement and propulsion refurbishment.

The Qiam-1, operational at approximately 700–800 km, introduces aerodynamic refinements and improved terminal stability, while the Zolfaghar extends to roughly 700 km with enhanced accuracy against fixed infrastructure targets. The Tondar-69 provides a 150 km strike option, and the Koksan M1978 artillery system, with a 40–60 km range, supports shorter-range fire missions in border theaters or proxy environments. These systems collectively allow Iran to hold at risk U.S. installations in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, eastern Saudi Arabia, and portions of Syria within extremely compressed engagement timelines measured in minutes. Their mobility and predominantly solid-fuel configuration complicate pre-emptive suppression efforts.

Beyond immediate regional reach, Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile inventory significantly expands its strategic envelope. The Shahab-3 remains operational at approximately 1,300 km and continues to serve as a backbone of Tehran’s regional deterrence posture. The Emad, a Shahab-3 derivative assessed at roughly 1,700 km, introduces improved guidance and maneuverability and remains in development. The Ghadr-1, another Shahab-3 variant extending to approximately 1,950 km, also remains in development, while the Khorramshahr, assessed at approximately 2,000 km, continues to be refined. The solid-fuel Sejjil, with a range of approximately 2,000 km, offers substantial survivability improvements over earlier liquid-fuel systems, reducing fueling time and vulnerability to launch preparation. These MRBMs place Israel, southeastern Europe, and deep Gulf strategic infrastructure within reach, altering engagement geometry and early warning timelines.

Iran’s cruise missile inventory adds a different operational dimension by exploiting low-altitude penetration profiles. The Ya-Ali land-attack cruise missile, operational at approximately 700 km, provides terrain-following capability designed to evade radar detection. The Ra’ad anti-ship cruise missile, with a range of approximately 350 km, enhances maritime denial capacity in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. The Soumar cruise missile, assessed with a range between 2,000–3,000 km and presumed operational, significantly extends strike reach through subsonic low-altitude flight at approximately Mach 0.8–0.9. Cruise systems complicate defensive architecture by forcing simultaneous engagement of high-altitude ballistic trajectories and low-altitude terrain-hugging threats.

Iran’s space launch vehicles, including the Safir, capable of reaching approximately 350 km altitude and currently operational, and the Simorgh, capable of approximately 500 km altitude and still in development, contribute to technological overlap relevant to ballistic missile development. Multi-stage propulsion, guidance refinement, and reentry engineering advancements derived from these programs enhance long-range missile expertise even if publicly designated for civilian space missions.

Open-source analytical estimates suggest Iran may possess between 6,000 and 10,000 missiles across these categories, although precise figures remain classified. Regional assessments indicate that approximately 800–1,000 missiles may have undergone reconditioning in recent months, particularly those capable of reaching Israel. Such refurbishment efforts likely involve updated guidance electronics, propellant replacement, and warhead modifications, extending operational life and potentially improving reliability during sustained combat operations.

The regional defensive balance is anchored by Patriot PAC-3 batteries deployed to protect key U.S. and allied installations. Estimates indicate approximately 15–20 Patriot batteries in operational positions. A typical PAC-3 battery consists of 4–8 launchers, each with up to 16 interceptors, yielding approximately 64–96 ready interceptors per battery under realistic conditions. This translates into an estimated regional pool of approximately 960–1,440 interceptors if 15 batteries are active, or 1,280–1,920 interceptors if 20 batteries are deployed. These figures do not account for reload timelines, attrition, mechanical readiness, or engagement doctrine.

Under high-threat conditions, defensive doctrine frequently requires two interceptors per incoming ballistic missile to maximize the probability of kill. In such scenarios, 1,000 incoming missiles could require up to 2,000 interceptors. Sustained salvos approaching 2,000 missiles across multiple theaters could exceed available ready interceptor inventories absent rapid reinforcement from THAAD batteries or Aegis-equipped naval platforms. Even lower-volume but highly coordinated mixed ballistic and cruise salvos could stress radar discrimination and command sequencing.

Iran’s doctrine emphasizes mobility, dispersion of TEL units, rapid displacement after launch, and mixed-wave attack strategies that combine ballistic and cruise systems to saturate and complicate defensive responses. Solid-fuel platforms such as the Fateh series and Sejjil reduce launch preparation exposure, while cruise missiles force layered tracking challenges. The effectiveness of this doctrine under active suppression will depend on the survivability of launch brigades and the resilience of command-and-control networks.

Operation Epic Fury, therefore, operates within a narrow margin between offensive missile mass and defensive interceptor endurance. If allied strikes succeed in degrading launch sites, storage depots, production infrastructure, and command nodes before large-scale saturation thresholds are reached, Iran’s theoretical numerical advantage may not translate into sustained operational impact. If not, regional missile defense architecture faces a prolonged stress test in which inventory depth, reload logistics, and layered integration will determine whether defended bases can absorb repeated high-volume salvos without strategic degradation.

The unfolding confrontation represents not simply an exchange of strikes but a measurable contest between missile inventory resilience and interceptor sustainability, with implications extending beyond the immediate theater to future assessments of regional deterrence stability.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.