Ukraine Uses Ground Robots and Drones to Capture Russian Positions Without Troop Losses.

Ukraine is shifting battlefield operations toward robotic assault and support missions as systems such as Ratel H, TERMIT, Droid TW 12.7 and KRAMPUS increasingly replace soldiers in high-risk frontline tasks. The clearest sign came when President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 13, 2026, that Ukrainian forces had captured a Russian position using only ground robots and UAVs, marking a significant step toward machine-led combat operations with no Ukrainian casualties reported.

Ukrainian robotic systems completed more than 22,000 frontline missions in three months, with platforms including Ratel, TERMIT, Ardal, Rys, Zmiy, Protector and Volia handling logistics, reconnaissance, fire support and assault roles. The rapid expansion of unmanned ground warfare is reshaping how Ukraine manages manpower, survivability and tactical offensives, while accelerating a broader shift toward autonomous combat systems in modern warfare.

Related topic: Ukraine’s DevDroid Unveils Droid NW 40 UGV Equipped With Remote 40mm Grenade Launcher for European Armies.

Ukrainian ground robots such as Ratel H, TERMIT, Droid TW 12.7 and KRAMPUS are shifting battlefield roles from direct human exposure to remote logistics, fire support and assault missions, forcing armies to rethink attrition, manpower and future combat planning (Picture source: Ratel/Frontline/Devdroid).

The Ukrainian case is important because it is not centered on a small number of expensive experimental vehicles. It is based on a fast cycle of codification, combat use, unit feedback and incremental redesign. The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine said in May 2025 that it had codified and authorized more than 80 ground robotic systems since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with nearly 10 domestic systems codified in 2023, more than 50 in 2024 and over 20 more by mid-May 2025. That sequence matters for military planning because it suggests that robotic combat power is being treated less like a major armored procurement program and more like ammunition, electronic warfare equipment or FPV drones: many designs, short improvement cycles, high losses expected, and operational value measured by missions completed rather than by long service life.

Ratel H is a useful example because its main military value is not firepower but the movement of weight through a lethal zone. Ratel Robotics describes the Ratel H as a robotic logistician and tow vehicle with a useful load of at least 400 kg, a radius of use of at least 50 km, a travel range of at least 60 km on hard surface or off-road, a speed of 8 km/h, day and night cameras, and a combat weight of 1,500 kg with payload. It is designed to transport cargo and ammunition, evacuate wounded personnel and carry additional technical equipment such as limited-range electronic warfare devices, stretchers or combat modules. In practical terms, this shifts one of the most dangerous tasks on the front, moving supplies along roads and tree lines watched by drones, from drivers and small infantry teams to a remote-controlled machine.

That logistics role has direct tactical consequences. A Ukrainian trench section that cannot receive water, batteries, ammunition or anti-tank weapons will lose combat power before it is physically overrun. A unit that must send soldiers into an FPV-drone engagement area for every resupply run is paying a manpower tax on each day it holds ground. Ratel H-type systems reduce that tax. They do not make supply safe, and they remain vulnerable to mines, artillery, signal disruption and direct fire, but their destruction does not require casualty evacuation, replacement personnel or the same political and psychological cost. This is why the phrase “robots do not bleed,” used by Ukrainian personnel in recent reporting, is more than a slogan; it describes a shift in the economics of attrition. The tactical loss of a robot can be absorbed through procurement. The loss of an experienced driver, sapper, medic or infantryman cannot be replaced at the same speed.

TERMIT represents a second category: the multifunctional tracked ground robot for unit-level support. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence codified TERMIT for operational use on June 21, 2025, describing it as a tracked system able to carry up to 300 kg and operate across rough terrain, slopes, obstacles and trenches. The ministry listed configurations for medical evacuation, logistics, mine-laying and transport of additional equipment, while also noting that earlier versions were already used by front-line units for logistics support and enemy surveillance. The tracked layout and low profile are important because ground robots must move where wheeled supply vehicles are too visible and where larger armored vehicles would attract artillery or anti-tank drones. TERMIT is not a main battle tank substitute; it is closer to a small robotic utility carrier designed to keep infantry positions functioning under persistent surveillance.

Droid TW 12.7 moves the discussion from support missions to remote fire. DevDroid describes the Droid TW 12.7 as a reconnaissance and strike ground robotic complex armed with a remotely controlled turret for a 12.7 mm M2 Browning machine gun, with target engagement up to 1 km, maximum speed of 7 km/h, tactical operating radius of 5 km and travel range of 25 km. The system can use manual guidance or AI-assisted guidance, with communications through MikroTik radio in basic configuration and optional mesh, LTE or Starlink links. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence stated that development began after requests from Ukrainian troops to reduce risk to personnel, that field tests began in 2023, and that the system was codified in December 2024. The same ministry report gives ammunition capacity, depending on configuration, of 480 to 1,000 rounds and target detection ranges of up to 1.5 km by day and 1 km at night.

The significance of Droid TW 12.7 is that it allows a commander to place a heavy machine gun in a threatened position without placing a gunner there continuously. That changes defensive geometry. A robot armed with a 12.7 mm weapon can cover a tree line, road approach or trench crossing point while the operator remains displaced from the firing position. It can also act as bait, forcing Russian troops or drones to reveal themselves. The limitation is equally clear: the machine needs communications, power, ammunition resupply, concealment and protection from mines or small drones. It is therefore best understood as a remote weapon node inside a larger kill chain, not as an independent combatant. The central doctrinal point is that the value comes from integration with UAV reconnaissance, artillery, electronic warfare and infantry command, not from the robot alone.

KRAMPUS adds a heavier assault function. On May 19, 2025, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence said it had codified the Ukrainian-made KRAMPUS mobile strike system equipped with RPV-16 reactive thermobaric launchers for Armed Forces units. The ministry described KRAMPUS as compact enough for transport in a pickup truck, minibus or trailer, powered by two quiet electric motors, fitted with a tracked chassis, equipped with EW-resistant control channels, and able to operate in cold, heat, snow and rain across forests, sand, swamps and steep slopes. Its weapon station uses RPV-16 thermobaric launchers against enemy personnel and lightly armored vehicles. This is a narrower system than Ratel H or TERMIT, but it addresses a specific problem: assaulting prepared positions without sending soldiers into the first exposure window.

These systems point to a new form of force design in which robots are assigned the missions that are predictable, dangerous and physically demanding, while soldiers remain responsible for judgment, coordination, deception and decisions under uncertainty. The strength balance changes first at the level of attrition. Russia has larger manpower reserves than Ukraine, and a war of trench raids, supply interdiction and artillery pressure favors the side that can better absorb personnel losses. Ground robots do not erase that imbalance, but they reduce the number of tasks that require a Ukrainian soldier to be physically present. They also complicate Russian planning: an unmanned supply route, a robotic machine-gun position or a thermobaric robot staged near an assault lane forces Russian units to spend drones, artillery rounds and attention on machines rather than people. This is a cost-imposition mechanism, similar in logic to FPV drones, but applied to ground movement and close combat.

The broader investment trend confirms that Ukraine is not an isolated case. The U.S. Replicator initiative was designed to field multiple thousands of attritable autonomous systems by August 2025, and the Pentagon said in November 2024 that more than 500 commercial firms had been considered across hardware and software opportunities, with contracts awarded to more than 30 companies, 75 percent of them non-traditional defense contractors. In Europe, the SAFE instrument adopted by the Council of the European Union on May 27, 2025 provides up to €150 billion in loans for urgent defence investments, including small drones, anti-drone systems, cyber, military mobility and ground combat support systems. In April 2026, the European Commission selected 57 European Defence Fund projects worth €1.07 billion, including Project STRATUS, an AI-powered cyber defence system for drone swarms with a Ukrainian subcontractor.

China is moving on a different scale and for a different scenario, but the logic is related: use unmanned or expendable systems to saturate defenses and force the opponent into unfavorable exchange ratios. Reuters reported in March 2026, citing the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, that China had stationed more than 200 obsolete J-6 fighters converted into attack drones at six air bases near the Taiwan Strait. Those aircraft are not comparable to Ukrainian ground robots, but they reflect the same planning assumption: low-cost or depreciated unmanned assets can absorb enemy missiles, expose air-defense networks and create pressure in the opening phase of a conflict. For NATO armies, the lesson from Ukraine is therefore not simply to buy more robots. It is to redesign units, communications, logistics, counter-drone defenses and procurement rules around machines that may be lost quickly but can preserve trained personnel and impose costs on the enemy. That is the battlefield of the near future: not robot armies replacing soldiers, but human formations using expendable machines to decide where soldiers must still be risked, and where they no longer should be.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.