Trump floats return of US battleships: Would Iowa-class add value over Aegis destroyers?.

President Trump raised the revival of U.S. battleships at Marine Corps Base Quantico on Sept. 30, 2025, citing Iowa-class armor and cheaper shells. Analysts and past Pentagon reviews say modern destroyers offer far greater range, sensors, and magazine flexibility, while reactivating battleships would be costly, manpower-intensive, and mismatched to missile- and drone-dominated warfare.

On October 30, 2025, at Quantico, President Donald Trump raised the possibility of bringing battleships back into service and cited the Iowa class as a reference. These remarks, reported by the defense press, revived a debate that periodically resurfaces in the US naval community. The presidential argument recalled thick steel sides, the idea that shells cost less than missiles, and the image of a fleet advancing in formation under heavy armor. For context, Iowa-class ships carried nine 406 mm guns capable of firing projectiles of more than one ton to nearly 40 km, and they were modernized in the 1980s with Tomahawk, Harpoon, and Phalanx systems. 
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On July 1, 1984, near Puerto Rico, USS Iowa fired a full broadside from its nine 16-inch and six 5-inch guns during an exercise. (Picture source: US Navy)

Technically, reviving an Iowa would involve far more than paint and pier-side trials. All four hulls are museum ships, maintained for public access rather than sea duty, and the steam-turbine propulsion requires expertise no longer available in the fleet at the necessary level. Ammunition for the 406 mm guns is out of production, supply chains have disappeared, and restoring the main gun systems, including safe handling of powder and charges, would require major investment. Upgrading sensors and combat systems presents additional challenges, since the ship would need a contemporary combat management system, modern fire control, a layered air defense, and integration consistent with Aegis and current data links. Active protection against drones and cruise missiles would also be necessary, which is not a peripheral add-on but a hull and shipboard power concept to be rethought from the outset.

Even if those obstacles were overcome, crew size is a major constraint. Iowa required more than 1,500 sailors. In a navy facing recruiting and retention pressures, assigning that many personnel to a single platform is a tradeoff. By contrast, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer sails with about 300 to 350 personnel and offers 90 to 96 VLS cells for surface-to-air, anti-ship, or land-attack missiles. In terms of payload, a 406 mm gun is formidable at short and medium range, but it cannot match the magazine depth provided by vertical cells distributed across a force of surface ships and submarines. The US Navy is focusing less on heavy guns and more on reallocating VLS capacity, offsetting the drawdown of Ticonderoga-class cruisers, and converting Zumwalt-class ships to carry hypersonic weapons.

Armor mitigates some effects but not all, in particular threats arriving from above with high terminal energy. The survival of a large ship depends first on detection, deception, and threat dilution. It also relies on dispersing sensors and weapons, strict control of emissions, and a network of manned and unmanned platforms. A ship that must close to less than 40 km to use its guns risks exposure to anti-ship fires launched from far greater ranges. Conversely, a force built around Aegis destroyers, attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and naval drones distributes lethality and reduces the incentive for an adversary to concentrate fire on a single high-value target.

An Iowa returned to service would not recover the psychological edge of previous eras. China does not operate battleships, but its Type 055 cruisers field more than one hundred VLS cells and sit inside an A2/AD construct supported by anti-ship ballistic systems, including DF-26. In such an environment, an Iowa would need to sail within a dense group under combined air and electronic protection, without assurance of surviving saturation salvoes from multiple vectors. On the Russian side, the modernized nuclear-powered cruiser Admiral Nakhimov embodies a missiles-and-sensors approach at long range. An Iowa reactivated with a limited missile fit would still be a gun-centered ship that must close distance to matter, accepting disproportionate risk for uncertain tactical gain. Framed by today’s emphasis on range, saturation, and networked fires, the historical battleship comparison falls short.

In a contemporary version, the battleship would not be an all-gun platform. It would be a 25,000 to 35,000 ton ship with integrated full-electric propulsion to supply high power to radars, jammers, and directed-energy systems. Protection would focus on an armored core around missile magazines, computing equipment, and vital compartments, combining high-performance steels, sandwich bulkheads, and energy-absorbing materials to limit fragmentation and fire. The principal armament would mix one or two heavy guns of 203 to 254 mm firing guided shells to 80 to 120 km for littoral support and interdiction, alongside 128 to 192 VLS cells for surface-to-air, anti-ship, and land-attack missiles. Close-in defense would be layered, with short-range missiles, two to three CIWS, a 200 to 300 kW laser for drones and rockets, plus a dense array of active and passive decoys. Automation would reduce the crew to about 350 to 500, and the internal layout would be designed to absorb damage and isolate incidents rapidly.

This concept does not replace multi-role destroyers. It fills a defined niche: sustained fire near the littoral, deeper magazines, a defensive pivot for a surface group in contested waters, and improved tolerance to damage compared with a standard combatant. The tradeoffs remain size, a larger signature, and dependence on robust air and submarine escort against anti-ship ballistic missiles and heavyweight torpedoes. Strategically, the value of such a program would depend on its marginal return relative to expanding AN/SPY-6 coverage, integrating hypersonic weapons, and scaling short-range effectors and counter-drone systems. If a modern battleship were ever built, it would effectively be an armored arsenal ship with useful but not dominant artillery, judged first by its contribution to networked combat and long-duration stock management.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Erwan Halna du Fretay is a graduate of a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience in the study of conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.