Poland Orders 3 Swedish Saab A26 Submarines to Rebuild Baltic Sea Undersea Warfare Capability.

Poland has ordered three Saab A26-type submarines in a SEK 47 billion deal that will rebuild its undersea warfare capability for the Baltic Sea, according to announcements by Saab and the Swedish government on 29 June 2026. The package gives the Polish Navy a new diesel-electric submarine force while preserving the skills needed to operate covertly in shallow, contested waters.

The contract includes weapons, training, support, and the lease of HMS Södermanland until 2032, giving Polish crews a live platform before the first A26 deliveries by 2038. This bridge matters because submarine effectiveness depends on experience as much as hardware, from acoustic discipline and submerged endurance to coordination with surface and air forces.

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Poland orders three Saab A26 submarines under a SEK 47 billion contract to rebuild its undersea warfare capability, strengthen Baltic Sea deterrence, and restore long-term submarine operations with Swedish training, weapons, and maintenance support (Picture source: Saab).

The procurement closes a long gap in Poland’s Orka program. Warsaw originally planned to replace its obsolete submarines more than a decade ago, but the Polish Navy is now dependent on ORP Orzeł, a Project 877E Kilo-class submarine commissioned in 1986, after the last Kobben-class boats were withdrawn in 2021. The issue is not only hull age; it is continuity of crews, sonar operators, weapon officers, engineers, safety procedures, and underwater command experience. Once those skills are lost, rebuilding them is slower than buying new equipment, especially in a navy that must operate in close proximity to Russian naval and air assets in the Baltic region.

The A26 is a conventional diesel-electric submarine with Stirling air-independent propulsion, a design choice that reflects the Baltic operating area rather than open-ocean patrol requirements. Saab states that Stirling AIP allows submerged operations for several weeks without surfacing or snorkeling, compared with only a few days for a conventional diesel-electric submarine without AIP. In practical terms, this reduces the number of times the submarine must expose a mast, diesel exhaust, radar return, infrared signature, or communications trace. In the Baltic Sea, where aircraft, helicopters, surface combatants, hydrophones, coastal radar, and unmanned sensors can be concentrated over short distances, fewer exposure cycles directly increase survivability.

The armament package has not been publicly itemized, and this point matters. Saab confirms that the Polish contract includes weapons, but neither Saab nor the Swedish government has identified the exact torpedoes, mines, or missile options selected by Warsaw. The A26 design is associated with heavyweight 533 mm torpedo employment and 400 mm lightweight torpedoes in Swedish service, while Saab’s Oceanic range material states that tube numbers can be adapted to customer requirements. Saab identifies Torpedo 62 as the Swedish Navy’s heavyweight torpedo, with pump-jet propulsion, a speed above 45 knots, and the ability to track and classify several targets at the same time; it also describes the Saab Lightweight Torpedo as a digitally homing weapon with wire-guided and fire-and-forget modes, built for cold, warm, shallow, blue-water, and brackish environments.

Operationally, this gives the Polish Navy three separate effects. First, a submerged A26 can create sea denial around approaches to Gdynia, Gdańsk, Świnoujście, and the central Baltic by threatening surface ships and submarines without disclosing its position. Second, the submarine can gather acoustic, electronic, and visual intelligence from areas where a frigate or patrol aircraft would be easier to detect. Third, it can complicate Russian naval planning from Kaliningrad and the eastern Baltic by forcing an adversary to allocate escorts, minesweepers, maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, and surveillance assets to defensive anti-submarine warfare. This does not require Poland to control the Baltic; it requires Poland to make hostile movement uncertain and costly.

The A26 also addresses a newer mission set: seabed security. Saab describes the submarine’s Multi Mission Portal as a means to deploy and recover special forces, swimmer delivery vehicles, unmanned underwater vehicles, and seabed mission systems; the company also states that the A26 can rest on the seabed, using hull strength and X-rudder maneuverability to support bottoming in shallow water. For Poland, that is relevant because the Baltic now contains energy terminals, gas pipelines, electricity links, data cables, offshore wind projects, and port infrastructure whose disruption could have military and economic effects. A submarine able to observe, verify, and operate near the seabed gives Warsaw options that surface ships, aircraft, and coastal sensors cannot provide alone.

The lease of HMS Södermanland is therefore more than a political gesture. The submarine is older, but it gives Poland a working Swedish AIP submarine before the A26 deliveries and allows Polish personnel to train in Karlskrona with the Swedish Navy’s submarine community. Swedish government statements indicate that Poland will also participate in test and experiment activities linked to HMS Blekinge and HMS Skåne, the two A26 submarines under construction for Sweden. That arrangement reduces the risk that Poland receives new submarines before it has regenerated enough instructors, maintainers, rescue procedures, dockyard routines, and tactical doctrine to operate them safely.

The industrial component is also material. Saab says it will establish maintenance, repair, and overhaul capability in Poland with Polish industry, which would reduce dependence on foreign yards during a crisis and give Warsaw more control over readiness, classified systems, and future upgrades. Independent Polish defense analyses have argued that any Orka decision should consider delivery timelines, interim solutions, crew training, infrastructure, and industrial effects, not only tactical specifications. The final Saab-Poland agreement appears structured around those constraints, although the long delivery period to 2038 means the program’s value will depend on training continuity, disciplined cost control, and whether Poland confirms a future land-attack missile role or keeps the A26 focused on torpedoes, ISR, seabed operations, and Baltic sea denial.

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Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.