US Navy launches first F/A-18 strafing attacks against Iranian tankers in Gulf of Oman.

U.S. Navy F/A-18 Super Hornets have carried out the first confirmed American carrier-based strafing attacks against Iranian-flagged tankers in the Gulf of Oman, marking a major escalation in Washington’s blockade campaign against Iran following the collapse of the April 2026 ceasefire process. During operations conducted on May 6 and May 8, U.S. forces targeted the tankers M/T Hasna, M/T Sea Star III, and M/T Sevda with 20mm cannon fire and precision-guided munitions to disable propulsion and steering systems without sinking the vessels.

Demonstrating a controlled maritime denial strategy intended to disrupt Iranian oil traffic while limiting environmental damage and mass casualties, the Super Hornet strikes revealed a deliberate U.S. mission-kill doctrine focused on immobilizing ships through attacks against rudders, smokestacks, and propulsion-support infrastructure rather than destructive anti-ship engagement. The operations also highlighted how carrier aviation, destroyers, ISR platforms, electronic warfare aircraft, and Marine boarding teams are now being integrated into a layered blockade architecture that could reshape future maritime interdiction operations in the Strait of Hormuz and other contested maritime chokepoints.

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F/A-18E/F Super Hornets launched from USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) used 20mm M61A2 cannon fire against Hasna and precision-guided munitions against Sea Star III and Sevda. (Picture source: US DoD)

On May 6 and May 8, 2026, U.S. Central Command conducted three maritime interdiction strikes against the Iranian-flagged tankers M/T Hasna, M/T Sea Star III, and M/T Sevda in the Gulf of Oman during enforcement of the blockade imposed on Iranian ports after the collapse of the April ceasefire process. F/A-18E/F Super Hornets launched from USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) used 20mm M61A2 cannon fire against Hasna and precision-guided munitions against Sea Star III and Sevda. The unladen tankers were intercepted while heading toward Iranian ports.

The tankers navigated inside a maritime enforcement structure involving more than 20 U.S. warships, nearly 200 aircraft, ISR assets, mine-clearing groups, and Marine boarding detachments operating from the Arabian Sea to the Strait of Hormuz. The strikes focused on disabling propulsion, targeting rudders, smokestacks, and exhaust uptakes rather than cargo tanks or waterline hull sections, indicating a mission-kill doctrine intended to immobilize vessels while avoiding catastrophic flooding, major hydrocarbon releases, or large-scale crew casualties. The 2026 U.S. naval blockade of Iran emerged after the failure of post-war negotiations between Washington and Tehran following the launch of Operation Epic Fury.

On April 11, U.S. naval forces began mine-clearance operations near the Strait of Hormuz after intelligence assessments concluded that Iranian naval forces had deployed sea mines during the conflict. On April 12, Vice President JD Vance confirmed that negotiations in Islamabad had failed, eliminating the final functioning diplomatic channel between both governments. President Donald Trump then ordered the implementation of a naval blockade targeting maritime traffic entering or leaving Iranian ports as well as vessels involved in sanctioned Iranian oil exports.

CENTCOM confirmed blockade enforcement would begin on April 13 while officially preserving transit access for unrelated commercial traffic through Hormuz. The IRGC Navy responded by warning that foreign military vessels operating near the strait would be treated as ceasefire violators and possible retaliation targets, sharply increasing escalation risks in one of the world’s most heavily trafficked energy corridors. The initial phase of the blockade enforcement relied on interception patrols, diversion orders, radio warnings, and surveillance flights. By April 16, CENTCOM confirmed that at least 14 vessels had already reversed course under blockade pressure without kinetic engagement.

The first major escalation occurred on April 19 when the Arleigh Burke destroyer USS Spruance (DDG-111) intercepted the Iranian-flagged cargo vessel M/V Touska in the north Arabian Sea while it was sailing toward Bandar Abbas. According to Gen. Dan Caine, the vessel ignored U.S. warnings for roughly six hours despite repeated escalation measures. USS Spruance first fired five warning shots before commanders authorized disabling fire using nine inert 127mm Mk45 rounds aimed directly into the vessel’s engine room after the crew had evacuated the compartment.

The use of inert ammunition disabled propulsion without detonating fuel systems or causing structural breakup, after which U.S. Marines boarded and seized the vessel by helicopter insertion, establishing the operational model later expanded through carrier-based aviation interdiction. The May 6 strike against the M/T Hasna marked the first confirmed use of carrier-based aircraft cannon fire during blockade enforcement operations. CENTCOM identified the tanker at approximately 0900 ET while it was transiting international waters toward an Iranian port in the Gulf of Oman.

After the crew ignored repeated warnings ordering the vessel to alter course, an F/A-18 Super Hornet launched from USS Abraham Lincoln attacked the ship using its internally mounted M61A2 Vulcan rotary cannon. Several 20×102mm rounds were fired directly into the rudder assembly, disabling steering capability without sinking the tanker or triggering major fires. The M61A2 mounted in the F/A-18E/F can fire close to 6,000 rounds per minute using high-explosive incendiary (HEI), semi-armor-piercing high-explosive incendiary (SAPHEI), and armor-piercing incendiary (API) ammunition optimized for penetration of exposed structural and mechanical components.

Effective maritime strafing normally requires low-altitude attack runs below 3 km, indicating that U.S. commanders assessed the operational environment as sufficiently permissive for visual target acquisition and direct cannon employment without immediate interference from Iranian aircraft or coastal air defenses. Targeting the rudder instead of the engine room reflected a controlled disablement approach focused on mobility denial rather than destructive anti-ship engagement. Tanker rudders expose only a limited surface area above the waterline, requiring accurate burst placement to disable steering without breaching lower stern compartments or damaging propeller shafts.

A successful hit can leave propulsion machinery operational while rendering the vessel incapable of controlled navigation through Gulf shipping lanes. The approach also reduced escalation risk by avoiding fires, flooding, or structural breakup associated with direct hull attacks. Hasna remained the least documented vessel involved in the incidents, with no publicly confirmed builder identity, propulsion configuration, dimensions, ownership records, or IMO registration number as of May 9. CENTCOM later confirmed that the tanker was no longer transiting toward Iran after the strike, marking one of the rare modern cases of U.S. naval aviation using aircraft cannon fire directly against civilian merchant shipping outside declared wartime anti-shipping campaigns.

On May 8, U.S. forces escalated further by conducting two additional interdiction strikes against M/T Sea Star III and M/T Sevda before both vessels reached Iranian ports in the Gulf of Oman. Unlike the Hasna attack, the F/A-18 Super Hornets employed precision-guided munitions instead of cannon fire. CENTCOM confirmed that the weapons struck the smokestacks of both vessels, indicating a focus on propulsion-support infrastructure rather than direct hull penetration. Commercial tanker smokestacks contain exhaust uptakes linked directly to propulsion systems, engine room ventilation circuits, and thermal management infrastructure.

Structural penetration of those sections can disable propulsion through smoke ingestion, ventilation failure, exhaust obstruction, or emergency machinery shutdown without rupturing cargo spaces or fuel tanks. Striking smokestacks rather than the waterline significantly reduced the probability of tanker breakup, uncontrolled flooding, or major hydrocarbon release into Gulf shipping lanes, indicating a calibrated mission-kill profile intended to immobilize the ships while preserving crew survivability and preventing environmental contamination.

The most probable munition used during the May 8 attacks was the GBU-54 Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition, a 500-lb precision-guided bomb combining GPS/INS navigation with terminal laser guidance optimized for moving maritime targets and low-collateral strikes. The GBU-54 is operationally integrated on U.S. Navy F/A-18E/Fs and is well suited for localized attacks against exposed shipboard structures, including exhaust stacks and propulsion-access compartments. A standard GBU-38 JDAM remained another possible option if both vessels maintained stable speed and heading profiles during terminal targeting.

The AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon appeared less likely because its 1,000-lb class payload would probably have produced substantially greater structural destruction than the localized damage observed after the strikes. Low-collateral AGM-114 Hellfire variants remained technically possible but operationally inconsistent with standard carrier-based Super Hornet strike packages. The continued buoyancy of both tankers and concentration of impacts around the funnel structures aligned more closely with precision penetration intended to disable propulsion rather than destroy the vessels.

Sea Star III represented the largest vessel involved in the incidents and operated as a Very Large Crude Carrier connected to the National Iranian Tanker Company commercial network. The tanker carried IMO number 9569205 and was built in 2012 at Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding in Shanghai. The vessel measured between 333 and 334 meters in length with a 60-meter beam and a displacement of nearly 317,500 DWT, while gross tonnage ranged between 164,680 and 164,796 GT. Registry records associated ownership with Amini Shipping Ltd.

Sevda represented an older Suezmax tanker built in 1999 under Iranian registry and OFAC sanctions designation with IMO number 9172040. The vessel measured approximately 274 meters in length with a 48-meter beam and a displacement of 159,681 DWT. Maritime registry data identified the tanker as powered by a MAN B&W marine diesel propulsion system typical of late-1990s Suezmax construction, optimized for constrained waterways such as the Suez Canal. The contrast between the two vessels demonstrated that the blockade targeted both VLCC export traffic and medium-capacity Suezmax routes supporting Iranian maritime oil logistics.

By early May 2026, the blockade had evolved into a distributed maritime exclusion architecture integrating carrier aviation, destroyer patrols, ISR aircraft, mine-clearance groups, Marine boarding teams, and airborne command-and-control systems across the CENTCOM theater. The carrier strike groups built around USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George H.W. Bush provided the primary strike aviation capability supporting interdiction operations. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, including USS Spruance, conducted interception patrols, warning procedures, diversion operations, and disabling fire missions against blockade violators.

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft likely handled maritime surveillance, airspace management, and target tracking during interdiction sequences, while EA-18G Growlers likely supported electromagnetic warfare and communications control. MH-60R Seahawk helicopters likely carried out visual identification, interception overwatch, battle-damage assessment, and support for Marine boarding operations. By early May, CENTCOM confirmed that nearly 70 commercial vessels had already been diverted, intercepted, boarded, seized, turned around, or disabled during blockade enforcement actions. For now, the ten confirmed ships include Deep Sea, Dorena, Sevin, Derya, Tifani, Majestic X, Sevan, Hasna, Sea Star III, and Sevda.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.