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Key Russian military district receives modernized 2S19 Msta-SM2 self-propelled howitzers to prepare troops for Ukraine.


As reported by TASS on January 4, 2024, the Russian Central Military District (CMD) has enhanced its combat capabilities by delivering over 40 units of missile and artillery weaponry to a motorized rifle unit stationed in the Orenburg region. TASS reported that the shipment includes the modernized 2S19 Msta-SM2 152mm self-propelled howitzer and the portable 9M133 Kornet anti-tank missile system (ATGM). According to the CMD press service, these systems are intended to support ongoing combat operations within the framework of the war in Ukraine.
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The Russian Central Military District's diverse terrain and expansive size allow to prepare Russian units for deployment in Ukraine, including training on vehicles like the modernized 2S19 Msta-SM2 152 self-propelled howitzer. (Picture source: Russian MoD)


The Central Military District (CMD) is the largest military-administrative unit of the Russian Armed Forces, established on December 1, 2010, through the merger of the Volga-Ural Military District, parts of the Siberian Military District, and the 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Command. It spans the Volga, Ural, and Siberian Federal Districts, covering 29 constituent entities of the Russian Federation and over 7 million square kilometers, approximately 40% of the country’s territory. The district's headquarters is located in Yekaterinburg. The CMD borders Kazakhstan, China, and Mongolia, emphasizing its strategic significance.

Furthermore, the CMD has played a key role in the conflict in Ukraine, with its units redeployed to the Western Military District near Kursk and Belarus around Gomel during large-scale exercises such as Zapad-2021 in September 2021 and Allied Determination-2022 in February 2022. CMD elements were involved in operations across various regions during the initial stages of the invasion. In April 2022, Rustam Minnekayev, the CMD deputy commander, outlined objectives that included establishing control over the Donbas and southern Ukraine to create a land corridor to Crimea and secure strategic facilities and ports. By June 2022, forward command elements from CMD were reported to have been redeployed within the Western Military District and Belarus to adapt command-and-control structures for operations in Ukraine. Leadership changes occurred in February 2023, with Major General Andrey Mordvichev replacing Colonel General Alexander Lapin following criticism of Lapin after withdrawals from the Donetsk region. CMD’s contributions include supporting broader objectives and maintaining an operational presence in critical areas throughout the conflict.

The CMD encompasses several Russian armies, air defense units, missile troops, engineering troops, and radiation, chemical, and biological defense troops, among other specialized forces. It also oversees military institutions, training centers, and logistical support facilities. The district is tasked with protecting state borders, ensuring mobilization readiness, conducting security operations, and maintaining combat preparedness. Its diverse terrain and expansive size require complex logistical planning and troop coordination, enabling this sector to prepare Russian units for deployment in Ukraine, including training on vehicles like the modernized 2S19 Msta-S.

The 2S19 Msta-S, adopted by the Soviet Army in 1989, was developed as a replacement for the 2S3 Akatsiya and to address perceived gaps compared to NATO’s 155-mm FH70 howitzer. Built on a T-72 tank chassis, the 2S19 introduced capabilities for engaging targets from concealed positions and firing various ammunition types, including tactical nuclear shells. It became a central component of Soviet artillery regiments, serving roles in countering armored vehicles, artillery, and fortifications. Early production of this 152mm self-propelled howitzer was undertaken at the Ural Plant of Transport Engineering and later transitioned to Uraltransmash following the Soviet Union's dissolution.


Footage released by the Russian Defense Ministry shows the Msta-SM2 being primarily used to support motorized rifle units by striking fortified positions and conducting counter-battery fire. (Picture source: Russian MoD)


Introduced in 2013, the 2S19M2 or 2S33 Msta-SM2 is a heavily modernized version of the 2S19, incorporating upgrades aimed at improving automation, firepower, and range. It features an automated fire control system, digital navigation tools, and enhanced loading mechanisms. Its 152-mm 2A79 cannon fires high-explosive fragmentation, active-reactive, and Krasnopol precision-guided munitions. The firing range exceeds 25 kilometers and can reach up to 43 kilometers with advanced projectiles. The system is integrated into the unified tactical control system (ESU TZ), allowing for real-time coordination and data exchange with UAVs and reconnaissance tools. It can execute "simultaneous fire raids," enabling multiple projectiles to strike a single target simultaneously, reducing exposure time during operations.

Footage released by the Russian Defense Ministry shows the Msta-SM2 being used to support motorized rifle units by striking fortified positions and conducting counter-battery fire. Its ability to coordinate with Orlan-10 reconnaissance UAVs has been highlighted as a factor in achieving precision strikes in Ukraine. These operations also include the use of high-explosive and illumination projectiles to target infrastructure and command centers. Tactical use includes counter-battery groups of 2-3 guns operating in designated patrol areas with pre-arranged supply and refueling points, reflecting adjustments to sustain operations under air defense constraints. Observers also noted its use in urban combat as an assault gun and its dependency on coordinated UAV support for effective targeting.

Chinese military analysts have recently assessed the performance of the Msta-SM2 self-propelled howitzer in Ukraine. Positive attributes include modified electronic components, partial digitalization of its fire control system, and integration with GPS/GLONASS. Analysts observed its rate of fire at 8 rounds per minute, its ability to operate effectively on soft and shifting soils, and its 50-round ammunition capacity. They highlighted its reduced visibility when equipped with the Nakidka protective kit and additional protective screens. Noted limitations include the absence of a fully digital fire control system, low mechanical reliability, frequent failures of hydraulic components, and inadequate crew safety due to the lack of armored partitions. The system has experienced operational losses, including destruction by artillery and HIMARS fire, as well as ammunition explosions potentially linked to North Korean munitions.

The other system delivered to the Russian Central Military District (CMD), the 9M133 Kornet, designated by NATO as AT-14 Spriggan, is a Russian man-portable anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) introduced into service in 1998. It is designed to engage heavily armored vehicles, including those equipped with modern dynamic protection systems, using a tandem high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) warhead capable of penetrating more than 1,000 mm of armor behind explosive reactive armor (ERA). The missile employs a laser-beam riding guidance system, providing targeting accuracy at ranges up to 5.5 kilometers in its standard version and up to 10 kilometers in the upgraded Kornet-EM. It can be deployed in infantry-portable configurations, requiring a two-person crew, or integrated into vehicle-mounted systems for enhanced mobility, complementing the Msta-SM2 in tactical scenarios. Since its combat debut in 2003, the Kornet has been widely used in various conflicts and has been exported to multiple countries, demonstrating its adaptability across different operational scenarios.


Chinese analysts noted the Msta-SM2’s integration with GPS/GLONASS and its 8-round-per-minute rate of fire as advantages for the war in Ukraine, while highlighting its low mechanical reliability and lack of armored partitions for crew safety as limitations. (Picture source: Russian MoD)


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