Ukraine Says Sabotage and Drone Strikes Disabled 4 Russian Fighter Jets at Two Air Bases.

Ukrainian intelligence says covert operatives and long-range drones disabled four Russian fighter aircraft during separate attacks at a base near Lipetsk and at Belbek airfield in occupied Crimea. If confirmed, the operations highlight a widening Ukrainian effort to reduce Russia’s airpower by striking aircraft on the ground, where losses are hardest to replace.

According to information published by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Security Service of Ukraine, on December 20 and 22, 2025, Ukrainian special services claim they disabled four Russian fighter aircraft in two separate operations, one a clandestine sabotage raid at an air base near Lipetsk and the other a long-range drone strike on Belbek airfield in occupied Crimea. If confirmed, the twin actions underscore a widening Ukrainian campaign to hit Russian tactical aviation on the ground, where even a single successful breach can erase aircraft, crews, and sortie capacity faster than Russia can replace them.
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Ukrainian intelligence and security services claim to have disabled four Russian fighter jets in two coordinated operations, using sabotage at a guarded air base near Lipetsk and long-range drones against Belbek airfield in occupied Crimea, underscoring Ukraine's expanding ability to strike Russian tactical aviation deep behind the front lines (Picture source: Security Service of Ukraine). 

Ukrainian intelligence said the Lipetsk attack occurred overnight on December 20 to 21, when two high-value fighters burned inside a protective hangar. Ukrainian and international reporting around the incident has carried some ambiguity about the exact aircraft types involved, with early descriptions listing a Su-30 and a Su-27 and later Ukrainian outlet updates emphasizing Su-30s, a reminder that independent verification is limited when attacks happen deep inside Russia,  and identification often relies on post-incident imagery and insider reporting.

What is clearer is the method. Ukrainian reporting cited by military intelligence indicated that operatives studied patrol routes and guard shift schedules for roughly two weeks, infiltrated the base, ignited the aircraft, and withdrew undetected. Additional reporting noted tail numbers “12” and “82” and that the aircraft were allegedly destroyed by fire inside the shelter, a detail that matters because it implies a penetration of base security and protected infrastructure rather than damage from an external blast wave.

If one of the targets was a Su-30SM, the technical impact is nontrivial. The Su-30 family is a two-seat multirole Flanker derivative designed to swing between air defense and strike escort, typically carrying a large external load across 12 hardpoints, withwidely cited payload capacia ty up to 8,000 kg. In Russian service, Su-30-class fighters have been used to cover standoff strikes, police maritime approaches, and provide the kind of flexible airborne presence that lets Russia mass glide-bomb and missile launches while keeping Ukrainian aircraft at distance.

The second operation was openly claimed by the Security Service of Ukraine on December 20, saying its Special Operations Center A, known as Alpha, used long-range drones to hit two Su-27 fighters at Belbek airfield in Crimea and to strike the control tower. Ukrainian outlets highlighted one aircraft on the taxiway with a full combat load, ready for a sortie, a scenario that directly targets Russia’s ability to generate rapid-response launches over southern Ukraine and the Black Sea littoral.

The Su-27 remains a valuable air-defense and interception platform even in older configurations, built around the N001 pulse-Doppler radar and supported by the OLS-27 infrared search-and-track system for passive engagements, a combination that helps defend airspace against drones and cruise-missile vectors while reducing reliance on emitting radar. Damaging the tower compounds the effect by disrupting flight control and sortie sequencing, forcing a base to slow its rhythm even if additional aircraft survive.

For Russia, the disadvantage is immediate and cumulative. Lipetsk is widely described in open sources as a core combat training and evaluation hub for Russian tactical aviation, so a successful sabotage action there pressures rear-area security procedures and can divert manpower to hardening, patrols, and internal counterintelligence. The broader arithmetic is also moving against Moscow. Open-source tracking indicates hundreds of Russian aerial losses since February 2022, including more than a hundred combat jets assessed destroyed. Russia can field new aircraft, but at a pace measured in dozens per year, not hundreds, making each additional loss on the ground harder to absorb over time.

For Ukraine, the significance goes beyond the four airframes. The paired operations illustrate a maturing airbase-interdiction playbook that mixes human networks, reconnaissance, and long-range unmanned strike to reach targets Russia expects to be safest, tightening the air war by reducing Russian sortie generation while signaling to partners that Ukrainian strike capacity is evolving despite resource constraints.