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Russia Deploys Modified Kh-59 Missiles in Ukraine to Address Critical Component Shortages.


Faced with increasing shortages, Russia has opted for unusual technical modifications on its Kh-59 guided missiles, replacing critical elements with mass-dimensional mock-ups. According to an image shared by the Telegram channel @Colonel GSh, Russian forces have deployed Kh-59MK missiles where the active radar homing head ARGSN U559 is substituted with a structure simulating its weight and dimensions. This adjustment maintains the missile's center of mass without compromising aerodynamic stability, allowing the weapon to be used in strikes on Ukraine, both in cluster and high-explosive configurations.

The images shared on Telegram appear to depict an internal part of the Kh-59MK missile's warhead or a similar version (Picture source: Telegram Channel @Colonel GSh)


The Kh-59MK is a long-range air-to-surface missile developed from the Kh-59M, featuring an active radar seeker designed to engage radar-contrast surface targets, such as boats and cruisers, with radar cross-sections of 300 m² or larger. It is deployed from aircraft like the Su-30MK, Su-32, Su-35, Su-24M, and MiG-35, functioning day or night, in adverse weather, and in sea states up to 6. The missile’s range was extended from 115 km to 285 km by replacing its booster with a fuel tank. The Kh-59MK reaches speeds between 900 and 1,050 km/h, flying at altitudes of 10-15 meters over water and descending to 4-7 meters in the terminal phase. With a 320 kg warhead, a 930 kg launch weight, and dimensions of 5.7 meters in length, 1.3 meters wingspan, and 0.38 meters body diameter, it has a high probability of hitting targets, ranging from 0.9 to 0.96 against destroyers and cruisers, and from 0.7 to 0.93 against boats.

The active radar homing head ARGSN is the most expensive and complex part of the Kh-59 missile. Its replacement by a simple metal mock-up likely indicates a shortage of these heads, limiting Russia’s capacity to manufacture fully equipped missiles. As a result, these missiles rely solely on satellite and inertial navigation, lacking the additional precision of radar. While this approach is economical, it increases the missile's vulnerability to electronic interference, particularly in the terminal flight stages, where Ukrainian electronic warfare systems can disrupt their path.

Besides lacking the active radar head, modified Kh-59 missiles also do not include the "Comet" satellite communication module, a feature that provides resistance against jamming and is present on Shahed-136 drones and Iskander missiles. This absence further reduces the Kh-59’s effectiveness in environments where electronic warfare is extensively deployed.

Furthermore, Kh-59 missiles continue to use the P95-300 engine manufactured by the Ukrainian company Motor Sich. Russia sources these engines either from Soviet-era stocks or by dismantling existing Kh-55(SM) missiles. This reliance on Soviet-era propulsion technology highlights a persistent dependence on limited resources, adding complexity to the supply and maintenance of these missiles during the ongoing conflict.

Since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has regularly employed Kh-59 missiles to target Ukrainian infrastructure. These air-to-surface guided missiles, launched primarily from Su-30 and Su-34 aircraft, have been used against both military and civilian facilities. However, their effectiveness has been limited by Ukrainian air defense capabilities. For instance, in October 2023, Ukrainian forces intercepted two Kh-59 missiles and 11 Shahed drones in a single night. Statistics indicate that Ukrainian air defenses have intercepted approximately 22% of the Kh-59, Kh-35, and Kh-31 guided missiles launched by Russia. This relatively low rate can be attributed to the fact that these missiles are often fired at targets near the front line, where deploying air defense systems is more challenging. Despite these obstacles, Ukrainian forces continue to improve their interception capabilities to counter threats posed by Kh-59 missiles and similar weaponry.

This trend of using mock-ups is not limited to the Kh-59. In March, Ukrainian forces shot down a Kh-55SM missile that contained a nuclear decoy, likely intended to trigger Ukrainian air defenses, allowing armed missiles to proceed unchallenged. By December 2022, the Ukrainian General Staff had observed that Russia was using Kh-55SM missiles with simulated warheads to address the lack of actual warheads. The use of these decoys reflects Russian adaptations aimed at maintaining pressure on Ukrainian defenses despite logistical challenges.


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