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U.S. Marines rehearse helicopter water insertion near Puerto Rico amid Venezuela tensions.
U.S. Marines with the 22nd MEU(SOC) executed helocast training from a CH-53E and the USS Iwo Jima off Puerto Rico in early September, confirmed in a Sept. 30 release. The capability signals a rapid, low-visibility ship-to-shore option in the Caribbean as regional tensions tied to Venezuela remain elevated.
On 30 September, 2025, U.S. Marines confirmed that elements of the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) executed helocast training off Puerto Rico from a CH-53E Super Stallion and the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7). Sourced to U.S. Marines, the activity situates a covert ship-to-shore insertion capability inside the Caribbean at a time when regional tensions linked to Venezuela remain volatile. The timing and location offer a clear signal of readiness: a scalable, sea-based option that can respond rapidly without telegraphing a large footprint.
Helocast training is routine for MEU(SOC) cycles, but context elevates its meaning. Conducting these drills on the doorstep of likely contingencies signals that Washington intends to keep options ready for scenarios that could range from non-combatant evacuation and infrastructure protection to maritime interdiction and limited special operations (Picture source: U.S. Marines)
Marines from the Maritime Special Purpose Force rehearsed a classic but demanding insertion method: jumping with an enhanced combat rubber raiding craft from a low-flying helicopter into open water, then pushing to a discreet shoreline beyond adversary observation. Conducted from the CH-53E Super Stallion and synchronized with USS Iwo Jima’s sea base, the evolution sharpened over-the-horizon approaches, clandestine beach entries, and low-signature link-ups, skills central to reconnaissance, sensitive site exploitation, and precision littoral raids in contested coastal terrain. Using the heavy-lift Stallion matters; it combines range, payload, and endurance, enabling multiple, simultaneous insertions along dispersed points of entry while maintaining the option to self-recover teams even in challenging sea states. For a Marine Air-Ground Task Force, that translates into credible access where airfields and ports are denied or closely monitored.
The advantages of this move are practical and immediate. First, it compresses response time. A forward-positioned MEU(SOC) embarked on an amphibious ready group can launch small teams within hours to surveil remote coastlines, secure critical infrastructure, or support partner forces, all without the diplomatic friction of a sizable land deployment. Second, it preserves political flexibility. Sea-based special operations offer a menu of actions below the threshold of major combat, allowing Washington to calibrate pressure or reassurance as events unfold. Third, it complicates an adversary’s targeting calculus. Dispersed, quiet insertions by small craft are harder to detect and deter than visible convoys or airborne battalion-sized air assaults, particularly along mangroves, river mouths, and shallow shelves that characterize parts of Venezuela’s littoral approaches, including access corridors near the Orinoco.
The strategic implications span the geopolitical, geostrategic, and military levels. Geopolitically, visible competence at covert littoral entry under U.S. Southern Command’s umbrella reinforces deterrence messaging to regional actors and reassures partners worried about spillover risks from disputes and gray-zone coercion. Geostrategically, the Caribbean sea base functions as a mobile, sovereign platform that can pivot between reassurance missions, maritime interdiction, and crisis response without dependence on host-nation infrastructure. Militarily, helocast-capable teams expand the target set: from monitoring illicit maritime traffic and safeguarding offshore energy nodes to enabling follow-on forces ashore if required. The presence of CH-53E-borne helocast modules aboard USS Iwo Jima therefore, shortens the distance between decision and action, giving national authorities credible options at the lower rungs of escalation.
Are the United States preparing to go to war with Venezuela? The exercise points to posture rather than predestination. Helocast training is routine for MEU(SOC) cycles, but context elevates its meaning. Conducting these drills on the doorstep of likely contingencies signals that Washington intends to keep options ready for scenarios that could range from non-combatant evacuation and infrastructure protection to maritime interdiction and limited special operations. The capability is inherently dual-use: it deters miscalculation by demonstrating access while avoiding the commitments implied by large, permanent deployments ashore. In practical terms, it tells any observer that the United States can move small, capable teams quietly, persistently, and at scale where it matters.
The message is unambiguous: by validating helocast operations from a CH-53E Super Stallion and USS Iwo Jima near Puerto Rico, U.S. forces are refining the precise tools needed to act fast and proportionally in the Caribbean theater. If events around Venezuela demand it, the United States has rehearsed the kind of discreet, sea-based access that underwrites deterrence today and enables decisive action tomorrow.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.