Analysis: Why Russia Remains the Primary Nuclear Threat to US in 2025?.

On May 22, 2025, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report titled Russia’s Nuclear Weapons. This report offers an updated and detailed analysis of Russia’s nuclear posture, focusing on capabilities and doctrine. It comes amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, heightened tensions between Russia and NATO, and the erosion of bilateral arms control agreements. The document provides the U.S. Congress with a foundation to reassess deterrence policies and risk reduction strategies in response to a Russia whose nuclear arsenal remains central to its military and political strategy.
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Russia is also continuing an intensive modernization of its strategic nuclear forces, notably including the heavy SS-X-29 (Sarmat) missiles, the SS-27 Mod 2 (Yars) ICBMs, and the Dolgorukiy (Borei) class submarines. (Picture source: Vitaly V.Kuzmin)

Since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has increasingly relied on nuclear deterrence as a foreign policy tool. He has issued direct nuclear threats, suspended certain commitments under the 2010 New START treaty, and transferred non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus. This shift in posture may prompt Congress to reconsider its approaches to deterrence and risk mitigation.

In terms of force structure, a 2025 non-governmental estimate places Russia’s deployed nuclear warheads at approximately 1,718. These are based on a triad consisting of 330 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 12 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped with 192 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 58 strategic bombers. Although Russia has ceased data sharing with the United States on its strategic nuclear forces since 2023, it claims to still adhere to New START limits, maintaining rough parity with the estimated 1,770 deployed U.S. warheads.

Russia continues to maintain one of the world’s most powerful nuclear forces, a legacy of the Cold War that has been undergoing active modernization since the 2010s. According to The Military Balance 2025, Russia allocates about 6.7% of its GDP to defense, equating to approximately $145.9 billion in 2024, a more than 40% real increase over the previous year. This budget supports the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear triad. The country fields various ICBMs, including the SS-18, SS-27 (Topol-M), and RS-24 Yars, and is preparing to deploy the new RS-28 Sarmat heavy ICBM. Russia’s strategic forces also include Borei-class SSBNs armed with Bulava missiles, and strategic bombers such as the Tu-95MS and Tu-160, capable of delivering Kh-55 and Kh-102 nuclear cruise missiles.

Russia is also expanding its inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons and developing advanced systems, including the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, Kinjal air-launched ballistic missile, and Zircon hypersonic cruise missile. These platforms are designed to overcome Western missile defenses and provide Moscow with flexible strike options, ranging from limited tactical use to full-scale strategic retaliation.

Given advancements in U.S. long-range conventional strike and missile defense capabilities, Russia has voiced concern about the survivability of its strategic forces. In response, it is fielding next-generation delivery systems. In 2025, General Gregory Guillot, Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), warned that, if deployed, these systems would significantly complicate the detection and characterization of an incoming nuclear attack, thus hindering the United States’ ability to respond effectively.

Concerns also emerged in 2024 over Russia’s intentions to launch a satellite capable of carrying a nuclear device. A 2025 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report noted that Moscow considers such counterspace capabilities to be a deterrent against space-reliant Western adversaries, and a potential means of disrupting or destroying their satellites if deterrence fails.

From a doctrinal perspective, a November 2024 revision of Russia’s nuclear policy outlines five scenarios under which the Russian president could authorize nuclear use: (1) reliable data indicating a ballistic missile attack on Russia or its allies; (2) use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia or an ally; (3) attacks on Russian government or military assets impairing retaliatory capabilities; (4) conventional aggression against Russia or Belarus posing a critical threat to sovereignty or territorial integrity; and (5) mass aerospace attacks crossing Russia’s borders. The doctrine also considers aggression by a non-nuclear state, supported by a nuclear state, as a joint attack on Russia.

Russia’s strategic deterrence approach combines nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities as well as non-military tools to manage escalation and conduct warfare. The 2024 U.S. Annual Threat Assessment stated that Russia continues to expand dual-capable systems as part of this strategy. Western analyses of Russian military literature describe a conceptual "ladder" of escalation, involving various degrees of dual-capable system use.

Since 2022, Russia has intensified its nuclear signaling through increased alert levels, missile tests, military drills, and changes in doctrine. In November 2023, it withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty while maintaining test site readiness in the Arctic. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko claimed in 2024 that dozens of Russian nuclear weapons were deployed in Belarus. The DIA confirmed in 2025 that Russia is enhancing its posture in Belarus by modernizing a nuclear storage facility, training Belarusian crews, and establishing delivery capabilities.

Some Russian political figures have advocated for limited nuclear strikes and more aggressive declaratory policies, arguing that the current deterrent posturing has failed to dissuade Western military aid to Ukraine. Western experts remain divided over the credibility of Russian nuclear threats. Nonetheless, the 2025 DIA assessment judged that Russia is unlikely to use nuclear weapons unless its leadership perceives an existential threat to the regime.

In terms of arms control, bilateral dialogue between Washington and Moscow has been suspended since January 2022. U.S. officials have expressed willingness to resume talks without preconditions, while President Putin has ruled out negotiations as long as the U.S. continues to pursue Russia’s “strategic defeat” through military support to Ukraine. Still, an August 2022 assessment by the National Intelligence Council suggested that Russia may continue to value strategic arms control as a way to limit U.S. capabilities.

In February 2023, Russia suspended its participation in the New START Treaty, halting inspections and data exchanges. A January 2025 U.S. State Department report noted that Russia may have slightly exceeded the treaty's warhead limits but did not engage in large-scale deployments. The report concluded that while compliance cannot be certified, Russia's behavior does not currently pose a threat to U.S. national security. It remains uncertain whether Moscow will choose to expand its strategic nuclear forces after New START expires in February 2026.

The 2023 Congressional Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture urged the U.S. to prepare for simultaneous nuclear challenges from both Russia and China. Congress may soon consider the commission’s recommendations regarding enhanced conventional and nuclear capabilities, alliance coordination, and adversarial risk management.