Germany could produce Ukrainian FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles to replace US Tomahawk purchase.

German defense manufacturer Diehl Defence has entered negotiations with Ukrainian company Fire Point to establish a domestic production line for the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile within Germany. The proposed industrial partnership aims to integrate Diehl’s advanced infrared and multi-mode seeker technologies to significantly upgrade the missile's terminal guidance system under intense electronic warfare conditions. This cooperative framework emerges as European states reassess long-range conventional deterrence requirements following the cancellation of planned United States ground-based missile deployments in the region.

The FP-5 Flamingo is a ground-launched strategic strike weapon capable of delivering a 1,150 kg warhead over a maximum range of 3,000 km using a simplified, high-volume production design. Initial manufacturing data reflect a rapid production scale-up by Fire Point, reaching an output of approximately three missiles per day by early 2026 to target deep military-industrial infrastructure.

Related topic: Ukraine's new FP-9 ballistic missile to target Moscow's energy infrastructure by summer 2026

Manufacturing inside Germany would reduce the FP-5's exposure to strikes against Ukrainian facilities while providing access to advanced industrial processes, advanced seekers, certification procedures, and long-term sustainment networks. (Picture source: Army Recognition)

On June 11, 2026, the Financial Times revealed discussions between Diehl Defence and Fire Point around a potential German production line for the Ukrainian FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile, with Diehl Defence chief executive Helmut Rauch indicating that they may provide a significantly more advanced seeker than the one currently used. If implemented, the arrangement would represent the first known case of a Ukrainian strategic strike weapon being manufactured inside a NATO member state's industrial base. The project emerges at a moment when Germany is reassessing its long-range strike requirements amid uncertainty over future U.S. ground-based missile deployments in Europe, as well as over a planned purchase of 400 Tomahawk missiles.

For Berlin, the attraction is not simply the missile's range, but also how European NATO members should develop independent conventional deep-strike capabilities. The FP-5 combines a 3,000 km reach, a warhead weighing up to 1,150 kg, a maximum takeoff weight of 6,000 kg, and a production concept built around relatively simple manufacturing methods, a niche that currently has few direct Western equivalents. The potential cooperation would consequently combine Fire Point's experience in wartime production and operational employment with Diehl's expertise in missile integration, sensors, guidance systems, electronics, testing, and industrial-scale manufacturing. Germany's interest in the FP-5 is closely tied to changes in the European security environment since 2022.

Russian forces have repeatedly employed long-range ground-launched strike systems against targets across Ukraine while maintaining missile forces in Kaliningrad and western Russia. This has increased interest within Europe in conventional systems capable of holding strategic targets at risk without relying exclusively on stealth fighter jets. From central Europe, a missile with a 3,000 km range could theoretically reach a substantial portion of European Russia. Unlike many future European missile concepts that remain in development, the FP-5 already exists, entered serial production during 2025, and has been used operationally. This is important because Western missile programs often require development cycles measured in years or decades.

The FP-5 offers Germany access to a weapon that has already moved beyond the prototype stage and into manufacturing, even if operational experience remains relatively limited. Fire Point revealed the missile in 2025 following a development cycle measured in months rather than years. Production reportedly began at roughly 30 missiles per month before expanding toward a stated objective exceeding 200 missiles monthly. By early 2026, company leadership indicated output had reached approximately three missiles per day. The missile's physical configuration explains how such production goals became feasible. The FP-5 uses a fixed straight wing instead of folding wing assemblies, while its turbofan engine is mounted externally above the fuselage rather than integrated internally. The airframe also uses a relatively straightforward design that prioritizes manufacturability over aerodynamic optimization.

These choices increase overall size and reduce elegance from an engineering perspective, but they simplify assembly, reduce part counts, and shorten production timelines. The missile is launched from a truck-based transporter-launcher using a booster-assisted takeoff, and because the launcher resembles a commercial truck during transportation, it can be concealed within ordinary road traffic until launch preparations begin. The maximum takeoff weight of the FP-5 Flamingo reaches 6,000 kg, and the warhead weighs up to 1,150 kg. That warhead weight is one of the most important characteristics of the system because it directly influences target selection. A missile carrying over one metric ton of explosive payload is not optimized for destroying a single radar vehicle or individual armored target.

It is intended to damage production halls, storage depots, industrial infrastructure, hardened facilities, command centers, electrical installations, fuel infrastructure, and other large fixed targets. The missile cruises at roughly 650-700 km/h, can reach a maximum speed of 950 km/h, and has a flight altitude that varies between 20 m and 10 km depending on the mission profile. Endurance reaches roughly four hours, while launch preparation generally requires around 20 minutes. This combination of long endurance, large payload, and strategic range makes it well optimized for attacks against fixed targets deep inside enemy territory. The guidance architecture, similarly, reflects a deliberate tradeoff between cost and sophistication. Navigation relies primarily on satellite guidance supported by inertial navigation.

Under favorable conditions, circular error probable is estimated at approximately 14 m. The missile does not incorporate terrain contour matching systems comparable to TERCOM, nor does it use image-matching technologies comparable to DSMAC. These omissions reduce complexity and cost but increase reliance on satellite navigation during the terminal phase of flight. This is precisely where Diehl's potential contribution becomes strategically important. The company has extensive experience with imaging infrared seekers through the IRIS-T missile and also possesses an expertise in semi-active laser and passive anti-radiation guidance technologies. Helmut Rauch specifically identified seeker technology as a potential area of cooperation.

A more advanced seeker would significantly improve the FP-5's terminal accuracy under electronic attack conditions and enable the missile to identify and strike a specific building, production hall, warehouse, command post, or other designated aimpoint within a large industrial or military facility rather than simply impacting somewhere within the broader target area. Several pathways exist for upgrading terminal guidance. An imaging infrared seeker would likely be the most practical option because it aligns closely with Diehl's existing technological base. Such a seeker could identify thermal contrasts generated by machinery, power systems, industrial processes, and large structures. An electro-optical seeker could enable visual target recognition during daylight and favorable weather conditions.

Passive RF guidance could support attacks against emitting radar systems, electronic warfare nodes, and communications infrastructure. Active radar guidance remains technically feasible but would introduce additional cost and electronic signatures. A multi-mode seeker combining infrared, electro-optical, and passive RF inputs would provide the greatest resistance to countermeasures. The challenge is economic. The FP-5 derives much of its attractiveness from a cost often estimated at approximately $500,000 per missile, when a Tomahawk costs roughly $3.6 million. Integrating advanced sensors improves performance, but excessive cost growth would undermine the missile's core production concept. 

To date, approximately 23 publicly known launches of Flamingo missiles have occurred. Six missiles reportedly reached their target areas. Two achieved confirmed direct hits and one additional success remains disputed. These figures indicate that the missile is still maturing operationally and faces substantial challenges when penetrating layered air defense networks. However, the most revealing aspect is target selection. The FP-5 has not been employed as a routine battlefield strike weapon. Instead, it has been reserved for targets with strategic or military-industrial significance. Known targets include an FSB facility in Crimea, the Skif-M facility involved in the production of Su-34, Su-35, and Su-57 jets, the Kapustin Yar missile test range, the Kotluban GRAU ammunition depot, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, the Promsintez explosives factory, and the VNIIR-Progress electronics facility.

Every target falls into one of four categories: missile production, missile testing, military-industrial manufacturing, or ammunition infrastructure. Production capacity remains constrained primarily by engine availability. Like the FP-9, Fire Point leadership has repeatedly identified engines as the principal bottleneck affecting output, as current Flamingo missiles rely heavily on AI-25s. Scaling production beyond Ukrainian facilities requires reliable access not only to propulsion systems but also to electronics, navigation components, and testing infrastructure. German manufacturing would address several of these constraints simultaneously.

It would reduce exposure to Russian strikes against Ukraine's facilities, provide access to European supply chains, improve electronics integration, expand testing capacity, and support certification for potential export customers. The significance of the project, therefore, extends beyond the missile itself. It represents a potential transition from wartime production focused on immediate operational requirements toward a multinational industrial framework capable of supporting sustained production over many years. If production is established in Germany and advanced seekers are successfully integrated, the FP-5 would occupy a unique position within Europe's long-range strike inventory.

The missile would combine a 3,000 km range, a 1,150 kg warhead, a cost measured in hundreds of thousands rather than millions of dollars, and production methods designed for relatively high output. The central question is whether these characteristics can be preserved while introducing substantially more sophisticated terminal guidance. Maintaining that balance will determine whether the missile remains primarily a large-volume industrial strike weapon or evolves into a more precise system capable of reliably engaging specific structures inside heavily defended military-industrial complexes.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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