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Iran’s Shahid Soleimani-Class Missile Corvettes Driving a New Naval Strategy in the Strait of Hormuz.
During the 17 February 2026 “Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz” drill, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy released footage of the Shahid Sayyad Shirazi launching a Sayyad-3G surface-to-air missile from a vertical launch system in the confined waters of the strait. The test suggests the Shahid Soleimani-class catamarans are maturing into multi-role surface combatants that could strengthen Iran’s sea-denial posture against potential U.S. intervention in the Gulf.
On 17 February 2026, during the “Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz” drill, the IRGC Navy released footage of the catamaran corvette Shahid Sayyad Shirazi launching a Sayyad-3G surface-to-air missile from its vertical launch system in the narrow waters of the strait. Iranian and international reporting described it as the first public, shipborne launch of this long-range naval air-defense variant, with an advertised engagement envelope of roughly 150 km. The test did not suddenly overturn the naval balance in the Gulf, but it signaled something important: the Shahid Soleimani class is evolving from a missile “truck” into a more complete surface combatant that could, in a crisis, underpin an Iranian attempt at sea-denial in and around the world’s most critical energy chokepoint.
Iran’s IRGC Navy publicly launched a long-range Sayyad-3G surface-to-air missile from its Shahid Soleimani-class catamaran in the Strait of Hormuz, signaling a more capable sea-denial posture against potential U.S. intervention (Picture Source: IRGCN / Britannica)
The four Shahid Soleimani-class corvettes now in IRGCN service are compact but heavily armed multi-role catamarans of about 65–67 meters in length and roughly 600 tonnes displacement, with aluminum twin hulls, sharp angles, and a reported top speed of around 32 knots. Their combat system centers on a mixed missile battery: six box-launched anti-ship cruise missiles (typically a combination of Noor/Ghadir and Nasir types), a vertical launch complex with six large cells for land-attack or anti-ship cruise missiles such as Abu-Mahdi, and up to sixteen smaller cells for surface-to-air missiles, complemented by a 30 mm gun, multiple 20 mm remotely operated Gatling mounts, chaff dispensers, and a flight deck with space for a medium helicopter. Iranian commanders also claim that later hulls can embark cruise missiles with ranges of 750 km and, eventually, a Ghadr-474 naval cruise missile reaching up to 2,000 km, although the real level of integration and stockpile depth remains uncertain. From a U.S. Navy perspective, these parameters suggest a platform optimized for sea denial and coercive presence, not for blue-water sea control, but still capable of affecting the local balance of firepower in confined waters.
Offensively, a full Shahid Soleimani salvo would likely combine several missiles with different ranges and seeker types, launched from a fast, relatively low-observable hull that can operate either inside the Strait of Hormuz or in the wider Gulf of Oman. In a crisis, it is plausible that these corvettes would be stationed on the approaches to the strait rather than inside the narrowest shipping lanes, using their 5,000-nautical-mile endurance to loiter at a distance and threaten tankers or escorts along predictable traffic separation schemes. Long-range land-attack or anti-ship cruise missiles cued by coastal radars, UAVs, and passive electronic support measures could, in theory, allow the IRGCN to engage targets without closing to gun or lightweight missile range, complicating the defense problem for individual U.S. or allied escorts. At the same time, the U.S. would almost certainly treat these ships as priority targets: their signatures, while reduced by catamaran shaping and aluminum construction, are still well within the detection envelope of modern surface-search radar, airborne ISR, and space-based surveillance. In a high-end exchange, the probability is high that survivability would depend less on “stealth” than on dispersal, deception, rapid repositioning, and Iran’s willingness to expose such scarce assets to U.S. long-range fires.
The Sayyad-3G launch highlights the other side of the equation: these corvettes are not just launch pads for anti-ship missiles but also potential local air-defense nodes. Open sources indicate that at least some ships in the class, including Shahid Sayyad Shirazi and Hassan Bagheri, are fitted with a mixed load of vertically launched Navvab short-range SAMs and a small number of longer-range Sayyad-3 rounds. If the claimed 150 km engagement range proves even partially realistic in operational conditions, a Soleimani-class hull positioned near the main shipping channel could, in principle, contest the airspace used by U.S. and allied helicopters, UAVs, and maritime patrol aircraft conducting surface surveillance and swarm-defense missions. In practice, that contest would depend on radar performance, fire-control quality, resistance to electronic attack, and the ship’s ability to survive the counter-strike once it lights up its sensors. It is reasonable to assume that the IRGCN would employ these air-defense missiles sparingly and opportunistically, seeking to create localized “no-go” bubbles rather than a continuous umbrella, knowing that sustained radar emissions would invite immediate suppression by U.S. airpower and ship-launched stand-off weapons.
Where the Soleimani class may be most disruptive is in its likely role as a mobile command and fire-support node for classic IRGCN asymmetric tactics. The catamaran hull offers a large working deck and crane able to deploy and recover several fast attack craft, effectively acting as a mothership for swarm boats that would still execute close-range harassment, boarding attempts, or mine deployment. In a scenario resembling recent tanker seizures such as MSC Aries or Talara, where small IRGC boats intercepted commercial shipping in or near the Strait of Hormuz, a Soleimani-class ship could plausibly sit over the horizon, providing beyond-line-of-sight communications, target updates and, if ordered, long-range missile overwatch against an approaching escort. This layered construct, shore-based missiles and mines, fast craft in the contact layer, and missile corvettes as standoff shooters and C2 nodes, does not guarantee Iran the ability to close the strait, but it raises the potential cost and complexity of any U.S. effort to keep sea lanes open under fire.
These naval developments have to be read against the wider pattern of Iranian exercises and signaling. In February 2026, the IRGC temporarily closed parts of the Strait of Hormuz for several hours, citing “security precautions” linked to drills that involved missile launches and integrated surveillance. Earlier large-scale exercises showcased cruise- and anti-ship-missile launches from coastal and inland sites, reinforcing an A2/AD posture that already includes substantial mine-warfare capacity and a dense network of small craft. The presence of four Shahid Soleimani-class ships in this environment probably encourages Iranian planners to think in terms of mobile “missile pickets” extending coverage beyond fixed coastal batteries, allowing them to experiment with distributed maritime operations of their own, albeit on a much smaller and less resilient scale than the U.S. concept. For commercial operators and insurers, even the perception that such ships might be forward-deployed into the Gulf of Oman or northern Arabian Sea could, in a crisis, translate into rerouting, premium spikes, and self-imposed slowdowns, effects that Tehran has long used as strategic leverage without crossing the threshold of open conflict.
From a U.S. and allied standpoint, the emergence of an IRGCN surface combatant with both VLS anti-ship and VLS SAM capability reinforces an old logic rather than creating an entirely new problem: any serious attempt by Iran to militarize the strait would demand a campaign against its maritime and coastal strike complex. The U.S. 5th Fleet, based in Bahrain, already trains and equips for precisely this environment, combining Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with Aegis air- and missile-defense suites, patrol craft, mine-countermeasures ships, maritime patrol aircraft, and an increasingly dense web of unmanned surface and aerial vehicles. Recent transits that paired L3Harris MAST-13 unmanned surface vessels with Coast Guard cutters and guided-missile destroyers through the Strait of Hormuz illustrate how the U.S. is already using uncrewed assets to extend sensor reach and keep manned ships further from immediate threat axes, a trend likely to accelerate as counter-swarm and counter-mine missions are progressively handed off to unmanned platforms. In any high-end contingency, it is highly probable that U.S. forces would prioritize the early neutralization or suppression of Soleimani-class hulls, exploiting superior ISR, long-range precision weapons, and airpower to keep these relatively few assets from shaping the fight for long.
At the geostrategic level, the Shahid Soleimani class should be seen as one strand in Iran’s broader attempt to build a credible threat to global energy flows and to U.S. intervention corridors, not as a “silver bullet” that can by itself lock the Strait of Hormuz. Multiple independent evaluations highlight that Tehran’s capacity to threaten maritime transit through the Strait of Hormuz stems from a combination of geographic constraints, tiered missile and mine warfare capabilities, and the use of fast-attack swarming tactics, all embedded within a broader strategy designed to enable controlled escalation while preserving operational ambiguity. In that context, the Soleimani-class catamarans probably function as visible symbols of technological progress and deterrent intent as much as practical war-fighting tools. Their limited number, modest displacement, and exposure to U.S. and allied anti-surface warfare mean that, in any sustained confrontation, they would almost certainly be outmatched. Yet their very presence raises day-to-day friction: every escort transit, every unmanned surveillance sortie, every coalition reassurance mission now has to factor in the possibility, however remote on any given day, of a VLS-backed engagement from an IRGCN combatant rather than just harassment from small boats.
Iran’s Shahid Soleimani-class corvettes and the recent Sayyad-3G launch demonstrate an incremental but real evolution in IRGC naval capability: a shift toward compact, fast, missile-dense platforms able to contribute both offensive strike and localized air defense in a highly confined, strategically vital maritime space. These ships, if employed intelligently and backed by coherent ISR and command-and-control, could make any future U.S. intervention or escort operation in and around the Strait of Hormuz more complex, forcing U.S. commanders to devote additional assets to surveillance, early warning, and preemptive targeting. At the same time, the balance of probabilities still strongly favors the United States and its partners. The U.S. Navy retains overwhelming advantages in sensor fusion, magazine depth, air and missile defense, and the integration of unmanned systems, all underpinned by a long-standing political commitment to keep global sea lanes open. In that sense, the Soleimani class is best understood not as a game-changer, but as a sharper tool in an Iranian toolbox that U.S. planners have been studying for decades, and for which they are already adapting counter-strategies designed to preserve deterrence and freedom of navigation in the world’s most sensitive strait.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.