Japan starts talks with Indonesia to transfer Asagiri-class destroyers to Indonesian Navy.

Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin agreed in Tokyo to launch formal working-level negotiations regarding the potential transfer of retired Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Asagiri-class destroyers to the Indonesian Navy. The bilateral talks focus on creating a comprehensive sustainment package covering crew education, gas-turbine maintenance, and operational integration into Jakarta's fleet architecture. This initiative follows Japan's April 2026 defense export framework revision, which eliminated historical restrictions on transferring lethal naval platforms to regional security partners.

The bilateral working group will evaluate the transfer viability of seven 3,500-ton general-purpose Asagiri-class destroyers equipped with Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles, and specialized anti-submarine warfare systems. The framework addresses whether the Indonesian Navy can absorb the 220-person crew requirement and complex combined gas-turbine propulsion maintenance cycles without overextending its highly diversified naval procurement budget.

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Introduced in the late 1980s, the Asagiri-class is a series of eight general-purpose destroyers operated by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) with a strong emphasis on anti-submarine warfare. (Picture source: Japanese MoD)

On June 5, 2026, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin agreed in Tokyo to begin talks on the possible transfer of Asagiri-class destroyers to the Indonesian Navy, as part of a formal bilateral review covering crew education, training, maintenance, sustainment, and operational employment. The destroyer class under consideration includes seven ships operated by Japan, including one converted for training use. The talks follow a prior Japan-Indonesia defense meeting in May 2026, which itself followed Japan’s April 2026 revision of its defense export rules, which removed the previous restriction limiting transfers to rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping.

These destroyers would place Indonesia alongside the Philippines, Australia, and possibly New Zealand in Tokyo’s expanding naval cooperation network. For Indonesia, the issue is not only whether Japan can provide hulls, but whether the Indonesian Navy can crew, refit, arm, maintain, and employ ships of this size without adding an unsustainable burden to an already diversified naval fleet. Japan and Indonesia have not yet agreed on the number of Asagiri-class ships, a delivery sequence, a refit scope, a cost-sharing formula, or a transfer schedule, and none of those variables is secondary.

A single transferred destroyer would mainly serve as an interim capability and training asset, while several transferred ships would require a deeper Indonesian commitment to Japanese supply chains, including turbine maintenance, combat system support, as well as torpedo and missile logistics. The working group’s first agenda will therefore have to connect four separate issues that are often treated too separately: how Indonesian crews are generated, how the ships are restored before delivery, how Japanese support continues after delivery, and what missions the Indonesian Navy assigns to them.

Training is a key issue as each Asagiri-class requires about 220 personnel, and those sailors must include bridge teams, gas turbine engineers, damage control parties, radar and sonar operators, weapons technicians, communications personnel, aviation support crews, and command staff. Maintenance is equally central because a 35 to 38-year-old destroyer can absorb large sums in corrosion work, propulsion overhaul, electronics repair, combat system support, and obsolete component replacement before it becomes operationally useful. The working-level format, therefore, gives both governments a way to determine whether the transfer is a real fleet option or only an attractive offer that becomes less persuasive once life-cycle costs are counted.

The Asagiri-class destroyer gives Indonesia a ship larger and more capable than a patrol vessel or small corvette, but also older and more manpower-intensive than a modern frigate. The class is a Japanese general-purpose destroyer displacing 3,500 tons standard and 4,900 tons full load. Each ship measures 137 m in length, 14.6 m in beam, and 4.5 m in draft, while four Kawasaki/Rolls-Royce Spey SM-1A gas turbines, producing 54,000 shp through two shafts, permit a maximum speed of 30 knots. This is operationally relevant for Indonesia: 6,000 nautical miles at 20 knots and 8,000 nautical miles at 14 knots allow a ship to move between distant patrol sectors without being tied to short-range coastal operations.

The drawback is that the COGAG (combined gas turbine and gas turbine) propulsion is built around gas turbines rather than a diesel arrangement, so the Indonesian Navy would need to possess the specialist engineering skills and maintenance routines suited to such machinery. The aviation facility is a major part of the ship’s value, with a flight deck and hangar for one SH-60J/K anti-submarine helicopter, turning the destroyer into a wider anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and maritime surveillance asset. The Asagiri-class carries eight RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles in Mk 141 launchers, giving it an anti-surface role against hostile surface combatants, armed maritime formations, or ships threatening Indonesian sea lines of communication.

The gun armament consists of one OTO Melara 76 mm/62-caliber weapon, useful for surface engagement, warning fire, and limited air defense tasks against low-end aerial threats. The ship’s air defense capacity is limited to one Mk 29 launcher for eight RIM-7 Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles, backed by two Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS mounts for terminal defense against incoming missiles and aircraft. The anti-submarine fit is more relevant to Indonesia’s geography: the class carries a Type 74/Mk 16 ASROC launcher, two triple 324 mm torpedo tubes for Mk 46 lightweight torpedoes, an OQS-4A hull sonar, and an OQR-1 towed-array sonar.

The radar and combat system suite includes the OPS-14/OPS-24 air-search radar, the OPS-28 surface-search radar, OYQ-6/OYQ-7 combat direction systems, Link-11, electronic support measures, a jammer, chaff and decoy launchers, and torpedo decoys. In practical terms, the ship would give Indonesia a mature escort and ASW vessel centered on helicopter and torpedo operations, not a modern guided-missile destroyer. Indonesia’s geography explains why Jakarta is examining this aging destroyer. The Indonesian Navy must cover the Strait of Malacca, the Natuna Sea, the Strait of Sunda, the Strait of Lombok, and wider archipelagic sea lanes, while also managing a marine jurisdictional area of about 6.1 million km² where commercial traffic, fishing activity, submarine movements, illegal activity, and state naval presence overlap.

A smaller patrol vessel can show presence and conduct constabulary missions, but it cannot provide the same combination of endurance, helicopter operations, underwater search, missile armament, and command capacity. The Asagiri-class is most useful where Indonesia needs to keep a ship on station, escort other vessels, monitor a chokepoint, support a larger maritime security operation, or conduct ASW patrols in coordination with aircraft and other ships. The helicopter is the largest operational multiplier because it can extend the search area beyond the ship’s radar and sonar horizon, investigate contacts, support over-the-horizon surveillance, prosecute submarine contacts, and assist search-and-rescue missions.

The towed-array sonar and hull sonar combination also gives Indonesia a more serious underwater detection capability than a gun-and-missile patrol combatant, especially in a region where submarine fleets are expanding. The Harpoon missiles also matter because they give the ship a surface combat role, but the more important long-term value for Indonesia would likely be ASW training, helicopter integration, escort doctrine, and sustained operation of a larger multi-role combatant. However, the Asagiri-class destroyers entered service between 1988 and 1991, which makes them 35 to 38 years old in 2026.

Ships of that age require careful assessment of hull fatigue, corrosion, shaft condition, gas turbine hours, electrical systems, piping, fire suppression systems, magazine safety, combat system supportability, radar reliability, sonar availability, and software or hardware obsolescence. Eight Sea Sparrow missiles provide only a shallow air defense magazine, and Phalanx provides a final layer rather than a substitute for modern medium-range missiles. The 220-person crew is also a real cost because Indonesia is simultaneously absorbing new or planned frigates, submarines, patrol vessels, and domestic construction programs, each of which needs trained sailors and maintainers.

The all-gas-turbine COGAG plant gives the ship high speed, but it can increase fuel and maintenance pressure compared with diesel-based ships used for long patrols. The transfer is rational only if Japan can provide the ships in a condition that does not require excessive refit spending, if Indonesia can secure spare parts and training, and if the total cost remains below the point where a new-build frigate, corvette, or offshore patrol combatant would offer better value. The ships can fill a near-term ASW and escort gap, but they cannot be treated as a low-cost substitute for a fully modern frigate force.

Before the April 2026 defense export revision, Japan’s framework limited defense equipment transfers to rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. The revised framework permits lethal equipment transfers, including destroyers, under specified conditions, while eligible recipients require agreements with Japan on classified information protection and related security arrangements. Japan and Indonesia already have the necessary agreement, which means the Asagiri case can move directly into practical examination rather than being blocked at the legal threshold.

The case also gives Japan a way to use decommissioned or soon-to-be-retired naval assets to create long-term defense relationships through sustainment, training, spare parts, dockyard work, and operational familiarity. For Indonesia, the same arrangement creates access to Japanese naval practices and ASW experience, but it also creates dependence on Japanese support for older systems that may not have large international supply pools. The broader Japanese naval cooperation has also gained momentum. The Philippines eyes Abukuma-class destroyer escorts and TC-90 aircraft, while Japan is supplying the first three of a planned 11 upgraded Mogami-class frigates to Australia.

New Zealand is another possible Mogami-class export partner, and Indonesia has also shown interest in upgraded Mogami-class frigates, but is expected to decide only after the Asagiri question is settled. Indonesia has also expressed interest in secondhand Japanese submarines, which would widen the naval relationship beyond surface ships and place Japan in a more significant position inside Indonesia’s already crowded naval procurement. On the Italian side, Indonesia is acquiring the former aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi, signed a €1.18 billion contract in 2024 for two Thaon di Revel-class multipurpose patrol vessels/frigates, and previously agreed in 2021 a package covering six FREMM frigates, two modernized Maestrale-class frigates, and logistics support, with implementation still affected by funding.

With the United Kingdom, Indonesia is building two Merah Putih-class frigates, derived from the Arrowhead 140, in Surabaya under a design-license arrangement signed in 2021. In January 2026, Babcock added an agreement for two more Arrowhead 140s, increasing the prospective class to four ships. With Türkiye, Indonesia signed for two MILGEM Istif/I-class frigates with TAIS Shipyards at IDEF 2025. Regarding submarines, Indonesia contracted the French Naval Group for two Scorpène Evolved Full LiB submarines to be built in Indonesia through technology transfer, with the contract entering into force on July 23, 2025.

This approach gives Indonesia political flexibility, multiple procurement channels, faster access to some capabilities, technology-transfer opportunities, and bargaining room with suppliers. Mirroring its air force, it also creates a fleet-management problem because each new asset brings its own engines, combat systems, weapons, training procedures, software, maintenance needs, and supplier dependencies. The deciding question is therefore not whether the Asagiri class has useful capability, because its combination of range, sonar, helicopter facilities, Harpoon, ASROC, torpedoes, and point defense is operationally meaningful for Indonesia.

The deciding question is whether the ships can be transferred with enough refit work, spare parts, training, and Japanese support to make them cheaper and faster than waiting for new ships, while not consuming the crews, budgets, and maintenance capacity needed for Indonesia’s multiple frigates, submarines, and domestic shipbuilding programs. If those conditions are met, the Asagiri class would function as an interim ASW and escort bridge for the Indonesian Navy; if they are not met, the ships would risk becoming another maintenance-heavy layer in one of the most complex naval forces globally.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.