Taiwan Tests U.S.-Made TOW and Javelin Missiles Against Maritime Targets to Refine Anti-Landing Defense Strategy.

Taiwan has demonstrated an expanded coastal defense capability by employing U.S.-supplied TOW and Javelin missile systems against maritime targets during a coordinated live-fire exercise, underscoring a growing emphasis on defeating amphibious assault forces before they reach the shoreline. During drills conducted by the Fourth Combat Zone and reported by the Taiwanese Military News Agency on June 3, 2026, Taiwanese forces integrated precision-guided missiles, artillery, and mortars into a unified anti-landing defense framework designed to target hostile forces during the critical sea-to-shore transition phase.

The exercise notably included successful TOW missile engagements against simulated maritime targets, highlighting Taiwan’s efforts to adapt proven anti-armor weapons for littoral warfare. Combined with Javelin teams, mobile firing procedures, and coordinated fire-support assets, the drills showcased a layered defensive approach intended to disrupt, delay, and fragment amphibious assault formations while strengthening Taiwan’s ability to sustain mobile and resilient coastal defense operations under combat

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Taiwan tested U.S.-made TOW and Javelin missiles against maritime targets during a major live-fire exercise to strengthen its layered coastal defense strategy against potential amphibious assaults (Picture Source: Taiwanese Military News Agency)

On June 3, 2026, Taiwan’s Fourth Combat Zone conducted a coordinated multi-site live-fire exercise, the Taiwanese Military News Agency reported, deploying artillery, mortars, anti-armor missile systems, and mobile fire-support platforms to assess the combat effectiveness of the southern defense zone. Held across Xishu Beach in Tainan, Fangshan in Pingtung, and Fenggang North Training Ground in Pingtung, the drills brought together the 137th Infantry Brigade, the 333rd Combined Arms Brigade, the 43rd Artillery Command, the Infantry Training Command, the Artillery Training Command, and the 99th Marine Brigade. The firing sequence included M110A2 self-propelled guns, 155 mm and 105 mm howitzers, 120 mm and 81 mm mortars, M1167 HMMWV TOW missile vehicles equipped with M41A7 ITAS launchers, M220A2 TOW missile launchers, and M98A2 Javelin missile systems. Beyond verifying individual weapon performance, the exercise reflected Taiwan’s effort to integrate mobile missile teams, coastal artillery, mortars, and coordinated fire-control procedures into a layered anti-landing defense concept aimed at threats approaching from the sea.

A central element of the exercise was the use of TOW and Javelin missile systems against simulated maritime targets. This detail is operationally significant because it shows that Taiwan is adapting land-based anti-armor weapons for a wider littoral defense role. In a potential Taiwan Strait crisis, hostile landing craft, amphibious armored vehicles, fast assault boats, support vessels, and dismounted formations approaching the shore would be exposed during the final phase of their movement from sea to land. By training M1167 TOW missile vehicles and M98A2 Javelin teams against maritime targets, the Fourth Combat Zone demonstrated how precision anti-armor systems can support an anti-landing strategy designed to break up an assault before enemy forces can consolidate a beachhead.

The deployment of M1167 HMMWV-mounted TOW missile vehicles carrying M41A7 ITAS launchers gives Taiwan a mobile and relatively survivable coastal precision-fire capability. The Improved Target Acquisition System enhances target detection, identification, and engagement under battlefield conditions, while the TOW-2A missile provides a wire-guided precision strike option suitable for controlled engagements against selected targets. The reported accurate hit of a TOW-2A missile against a target at sea demonstrated not only the missile’s ability to strike a maritime target but also the crew’s capacity to maintain tracking, apply wire-guided correction, and complete the engagement sequence under live-fire conditions. In coastal combat, this type of discipline is essential because targets may be moving, partially obscured, or operating under covering fire.

The M98A2 Javelin missile systems add a complementary layer to this shore-defense architecture. While TOW is more suited to vehicle-mounted engagements from prepared or semi-prepared positions, Javelin gives infantry and marine teams a more portable fire-and-forget capability. This allows small units to operate from concealed terrain, urban edges, secondary defensive belts, beach exits, and road junctions where enemy landing forces would need to move after reaching shore. Together, TOW and Javelin systems create overlapping engagement zones. TOW vehicles can strike maritime and amphibious targets during the approach phase, while Javelin teams can cover closer, dispersed, or follow-on targets once hostile forces attempt to move inland.

The exercise also emphasized mobile firing procedures, target identification and lock-on, wire-guided missile correction, rapid displacement after firing, and coordinated artillery fire control. These are not secondary details but core requirements for survivability in a Taiwan Strait scenario. Any missile team or artillery battery firing from coastal positions would likely face rapid counterfire from drones, loitering munitions, attack helicopters, naval gunfire, rockets, or precision-guided weapons. The ability to fire, assess the result, displace quickly, and re-engage from another location is therefore essential. This shoot-and-scoot approach allows Taiwan to preserve combat power while forcing an adversary to search for dispersed and mobile targets rather than fixed firing points.

The artillery and mortar components gave the missile engagements broader tactical value. At Xishu Beach, 155 mm and 105 mm howitzers conducted area fire, high-angle fire, illumination missions, and airburst-fuze firing, while other firing activities included self-propelled howitzers and coordinated fire missions. At Fangshan, 120 mm and 81 mm mortars supported the live-fire sequence alongside TOW and Javelin systems. At Fenggang North, M110A2 self-propelled guns and 155 mm howitzers were used to verify fire-support procedures and key-area fire control. In a coastal defense battle, artillery and mortars can suppress landing zones, disrupt formations, illuminate night approaches, force enemy vehicles into predictable routes, and support missile teams by shaping the battlefield before precision weapons are used against priority targets.

From a strategic perspective, the exercise shows that Taiwan is preparing for the specific challenge posed by China’s ability to generate military pressure across the Taiwan Strait. Amphibious operations are among the most complex forms of warfare because they require coordination between naval, air, missile, logistics, command, and ground forces. They are also vulnerable during the transition from sea to shore. Taiwan’s defense concept seeks to exploit that vulnerability by creating layered zones of fire along likely coastal approaches. The combination of howitzers, mortars, TOW missiles, Javelin missiles, mobile firing vehicles, and dispersed infantry teams is intended to make any attempted landing costly, slow, and uncertain.

The geographic setting of the exercise also matters. Tainan and Pingtung are part of Taiwan’s southern defense space, facing waters linked to the Taiwan Strait, the southern approaches to the island, and the wider maritime routes around the Bashi Channel. These areas would be important in any scenario involving amphibious pressure, maritime interdiction, or attempts to open new axes of approach against Taiwan’s coastline. Conducting live-fire training at Xishu Beach, Fangshan, and Fenggang North therefore has operational meaning beyond local training. It allows Taiwanese forces to rehearse the use of real terrain, coastal firing zones, and defensive positions that could be relevant in wartime.

The exercise also highlights the continued value of U.S.-origin weapons in Taiwan’s defensive posture. TOW and Javelin systems are not offensive strategic weapons; they are tactical defensive systems designed to stop armored, mechanized, and amphibious threats at decisive points on the battlefield. Their importance lies in mobility, precision, relative ease of dispersion, and the ability to give small units the means to destroy high-value targets. In this context, the use of M1167 TOW missile vehicles, M41A7 ITAS launchers, TOW-2A missiles, and M98A2 Javelin systems reflects a credible deterrence-by-denial approach. It also demonstrates the practical value of U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation in strengthening Taiwan’s ability to defend its territory with systems suited to dispersed, resilient, and mobile operations.

The June 3 live-fire exercise by Taiwan’s Fourth Combat Zone carried significance beyond the number of weapons fired. It showed how Taiwan is combining mobile anti-armor missiles, artillery, mortars, target acquisition, rapid displacement, and coordinated fire-control procedures into a coherent anti-landing defense concept. The accurate engagement of a maritime target by a TOW-2A missile, the deployment of M98A2 Javelin systems, and the integration of multiple artillery and mortar assets demonstrated a force training for the realities of coastal combat rather than symbolic display. Against the backdrop of continued Chinese military pressure, the exercise underlined Taiwan’s determination to defend its shores, use its home-field advantage, and rely on mobile precision fires as a central pillar of homeland defense.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.