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Russia Explores Manned–Unmanned Teaming Centered on Su-30SM Fighters and S-70 Okhotnik Drones.
A senior Russian military aviator says Moscow is exploring closer integration between Su-30SM multirole fighters and the S-70 Okhotnik heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicle. The concept signals continued Russian investment in manned aviation while advancing loyal wingman-style tactics that could reshape its future air combat doctrine.
On February 25, 2026, Russian news outlet NEWS.ru published an interview with Russian Military Pilot Major General Vladimir Popov in which he outlined his vision for the future of manned and unmanned combat aviation. In this discussion, he described a concept of close cooperation between fighter aircraft and heavy unmanned aerial vehicles as a “new philosophy” of warfare. The interview suggests that Russia is exploring manned–unmanned teaming centred on Su-30SM multirole fighters and the S-70 Okhotnik UAV, a development with potential implications for air combat tactics and force structure. In the NEWS.ru report, Popov stated that manned aviation is expected to remain a priority for decades, even as unmanned systems continue to evolve alongside it.
Russia is evaluating a manned-unmanned teaming concept that would integrate Su-30SM multirole fighters with S-70 Okhotnik unmanned combat aerial vehicles to enhance future air combat capability and force structure flexibility (Picture Source: Rostec / Russian Social Media)
In his remarks to NEWS.ru, Popov stresses that current trends in military aviation are clearly shifting toward unmanned platforms, but he frames this not as a replacement for pilots, rather as a reconfiguration of roles. He states that the S-70 Okhotnik unmanned combat aerial vehicle can operate “in a complex” with the Su30SM, and that aircraft such as the Su-32 and Su-30SM are able to interact with UAVs while accomplishing the same mission set normally assigned to manned aviation, but with greater safety for the aircrews. Taken at face value, this suggests that Russian planners are at least conceptually positioning Su-30SM crews as mission commanders within a wider network that includes remotely operated or autonomous strike and reconnaissance assets.
At the centre of this concept are the Su-30SM and S-70 platforms themselves. In the NEWS.ru interview, Popov describes the Su-30SM and Su-35S as well-proven combat aircraft that form the backbone of Russia’s current Aerospace Forces and “fully meet modern requirements.” Within that force mix, the Su-30SM is portrayed as a key multirole platform capable of integrating with unmanned systems. The S-70 Okhotnik, in turn, is presented as a heavy UAV that could be teamed with Su-30SM airframes, suggesting a manned–unmanned package in which the fighter provides command, situational awareness and rules-of-engagement decisions, while the drone undertakes high-risk missions in contested airspace. Although the interview does not provide technical details, the pairing implies an architecture of datalinks, sensor fusion and distributed weapons employment typical of manned–unmanned teaming concepts.
General Popov’s statements indicate that Russian doctrine may be evolving toward using Su-30SM-class fighters as airborne controllers for UAV formations rather than as single, independent shooters. If realized, such a construct would allow manned aircraft to stand off at safer ranges while unmanned systems conduct strike, suppression of enemy air defences, or reconnaissance tasks closer to threat emitters. Popov explicitly highlights the benefit of preserving flight personnel by having unmanned platforms execute the same objectives as piloted aircraft “more safely in the interests of preserving the flight crew.” This logic is consistent with international trends in air combat, where survivability, attrition tolerance and the ability to sustain high sortie rates under dense air-defence threats increasingly drive concept development.
From a tactical standpoint, the potential teaming of Su-30SM with S-70 Okhotnik could enable more complex employment of weapons and sensors at the package level rather than at the individual aircraft level. A Su30SM acting as a command node might coordinate ISR from onboard and offboard sensors, allocate targets between manned and unmanned shooters, and dynamically adapt the formation’s flight profile based on threat evolution. In such a framework, the UAV becomes an expendable or at least more risk-tolerant extension of the fighter’s weapons and sensor envelope. Popov’s portrayal of this as a “new philosophy of conducting combat operations” suggests that Russian operational planners may be thinking in terms of networked strike packages rather than discrete sorties, although the degree of maturity of these concepts cannot be determined from his interview alone.
The view that manned aviation will remain a priority for roughly the next fifty years, even as unmanned systems advance and potentially rival or surpass their manned counterparts, suggests that Russian force planning envisions an incremental rather than revolutionary transition. Manned fighter units such as Su-30SM and Su-35S squadrons are likely to remain the core of the Aerospace Forces’ combat aviation structure, with UAVs layered in as force multipliers and risk-sharing assets. This would align with a procurement and training philosophy in which pilot expertise, cockpit decision-making and human judgment in rules-of-engagement remain central, while unmanned platforms gradually assume a growing share of hazardous or routine tasks. Popov’s comments, therefore, appear to reflect a doctrinal balance between continuity in manned aviation and adaptation toward greater automation and robotics, both in the air and, as he notes, on the ground.
Geostrategically, such a trajectory could influence how Russia positions its airpower in relation to peer and near-peer competitors. If concepts like Su-30SM–S-70 teaming move beyond the conceptual stage into operational practice, they may enhance the perceived deterrent value of Russian air combat units by increasing their flexibility and resilience under high-threat conditions. At the same time, the emphasis on long-term coexistence of manned and unmanned platforms signals that Moscow does not intend to abandon traditional pilot-centred air forces, but rather to overlay them with a growing ecosystem of robotic systems. General Popov’s interview provides a rare, though limited, glimpse into how a senior Russian military aviator envisions the balance between human and machine in the future air order of battle, while leaving open many questions about timelines, scale of deployment and concrete technical implementation.
General Popov’s remarks, as reported by NEWS.ru on February 25, 2026, ultimately sketch a future in which Su30SM and similar fighters remain at the heart of Russian airpower but increasingly operate as command platforms within mixed manned–unmanned formations that include systems like the S-70 Okhotnik. Manned aviation is expected to retain primacy, yet unmanned aircraft are projected to evolve to a point where their performance may equal or surpass that of traditional piloted combat jets. Within this framework, Russia appears to be pursuing an evolutionary path in air warfare, seeking to combine the experience and judgment of human pilots with the endurance and risk tolerance of robotic systems, and thereby reshape how air campaigns are planned and executed over the coming decades.