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China and Vietnam Launch First Joint Patrol of 2025 in Gulf of Tonkin as Tensions Linger Beneath the Surface.
On February 27, 2025, the coast guards of China and Vietnam carried out their first joint patrol of the year in the northern waters of the Gulf of Tonkin, also known as the Bac Bo Gulf. The operation took place between Mong Cai city in Vietnam’s Quang Ninh province and Dongxing city in China’s Guangxi region. The mission aimed to enhance bilateral coordination in maritime law enforcement, monitor fishing vessels, deter illegal activities, and manage emergencies at sea.
The coast guards of China and Vietnam conducted the first joint patrol in 2023 in the Beibu Gulf from April 11 to 13 (Picture source: Chinese MoD)
It continues a pattern of cooperation between the two coast guard services established in 2006. The Chinese patrol ship 4301 was deployed during the operation alongside Vietnamese vessels. Vietnamese coast guard officers also conducted awareness campaigns among national fishing crews operating in the border area, reminding them of the regulations regarding illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, in an effort to meet European Commission requirements and support the long-term sustainability of the domestic fishing industry.
This patrol is the fifth such joint mission conducted in shared waters since 2024. It is part of a quarterly framework of cooperation designed to promote safety and order at sea, uphold legal compliance by local populations, and maintain open lines of operational communication between the two states. The Gulf of Tonkin, which benefits from a more clearly defined maritime boundary compared to other contested areas in the South China Sea, offers a relatively stable environment for such initiatives. These patrols are supported by technical efforts such as route optimization programs launched in 2023 by Guangxi’s maritime administration to reduce navigational risks in the region’s high-traffic zones.
Despite these operational arrangements, underlying tensions remain significant. Vietnam and China continue to clash over territorial claims in the South China Sea, particularly concerning the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China asserts extensive sovereignty over nearly the entire sea via the "nine-dash line," a unilateral claim rejected by Hanoi and ruled illegitimate by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 2016. These overlapping claims have led to frequent incidents, including the detention of Vietnamese fishermen, the deployment of Chinese surveillance ships, and unilateral drilling operations in contested waters. This long-standing maritime dispute has created a climate of mutual distrust, complicating broader efforts at regional coordination.
Against this backdrop, the February 2025 joint patrol carries a symbolic dimension. It reflects a tactical form of engagement between two countries that remain at odds but are willing to cooperate in areas where confrontation is less intense. The Gulf of Tonkin, given its relatively stable legal status, serves as a testing ground for shared maritime governance and localized risk mitigation. It highlights a cautious approach to conflict management, where low-intensity cooperation helps prevent escalation without resolving the deeper strategic divides.
The patrol also underscores Vietnam’s "cooperate and struggle" strategy toward China. This approach blends selective engagements such as technical and legal cooperation in defined maritime zones, with continued efforts to strengthen national defense capabilities and assert maritime claims. By pursuing this dual path, Vietnam seeks to protect its sovereignty while avoiding unnecessary provocations in areas where practical coordination is still possible.
Ultimately, this first joint patrol of 2025 does not mark a shift in the strategic balance between China and Vietnam but illustrates how limited, functional cooperation can persist in specific maritime areas. It demonstrates that, despite unresolved disputes, both countries are maintaining minimal operational dialogue to manage maritime risks in the short term and preserve relative stability in one of the Asia-Pacific region’s most contested maritime environments.